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 i 
Abstract 
Cognitive biases can involve the tendency to extract some sensory inputs while ignoring others. 
Cognitive biases impact perception, and subsequent processing decisions made on the basis of 
perception. Cognitive biases can disrupt accurate and efficient processing of social information, 
and may underlie core features of social communication difficulties. How cognitive biases 
contribute to atypical social processing associated with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) traits is 
unknown. We examined whether cognitive biases for emotional faces were related to scores from 
the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ), and whether our measures of cognitive biases from a dot-
probe paradigm with concurrent eye tracking were comparable. We did not find sufficient 
evidence to relate ASD traits and cognitive biases. We found limited eye movements made 
during the paradigm and no relationship between the two concurrent measures. We highlight 
outstanding questions in the investigation of ASD traits and cognitive biases through the dot-
probe paradigm and eye tracking. 
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 ii 
Summary for Lay Audience 
Cognitive biases describe patterns of thinking that affect the decisions people make. We take 
shortcuts to think quickly about complex problems, and cognitive biases help us to do this. Most 
biases are stable tendencies that people will continue to display over time, and can affect how we 
pay attention to, remember, and interpret information. Cognitive biases can look like social and 
behavioral problems when people deal with information differently, and they may be linked to 
some of the social and behavioral problems often reported in autism. If there is a link between 
these two kinds of problems, people with more autism-like features would look at others’ faces 
differently than people without social and behavioral problems. We largely found people with 
more autism-like features did not show different cognitive biases when looking at others’ faces, 
but that factors of our design might have contributed to this being the case. We discuss ways to 
adapt the current design for future use. 
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
Cognitive biases refer to systematic patterns in which perception and experience inform how we 
navigate the world. Often considered deviations from optimal or rational responses (Haselton, 
Nettle, & Murray, 2015), cognitive biases are thought to arise as a consequence of the inherent 
limitations to cognitive processing. Although they can develop to improve efficiency in 
information processing, cognitive biases may also carry consequences for accuracy in 
information processing. Most commonly conceptualized as the tendency to preferentially process 
some sensory inputs while ignoring others, cognitive biases are well documented across many 
aspects of human cognition. Biased processing patterns are indeed documented for decision-
making and memory skills (Teovanovic, Knezevic, & Stankov, 2015), alongside attention, 
interpretation, and reasoning domains (Mathews & MacLeod, 2015). Given the impact of biased 
processing to daily functioning, it follows that alongside the profound perceptual differences 
they can bring, cognitive biases may also contribute to detriments in social communication and 
emotion processing abilities.  
The processes which integrate to give rise to cognitive biases are not fully understood, and 
this holds true across the variety cognitive domains in which they have been measured. However, 
there is some evidence to suggest cognitive biases are at least in part self-reinforcing, such that 
biased processing leads to cyclical and preferential processing tendencies (Wachtel, 1994). 
Within this cycle, an individual who preferentially processes certain inputs over others is more 
likely to repeat the same pattern and ignore other inputs over time. Cognitive biases may indeed 
become rigid and difficult to shift over time, even if they arise from irrational or competing 
processes. Rigidity in taking in information over time can serve to inhibit how information is 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
processed; the individual will overlook key information, simply because it falls outside of the 
scope of the processing pattern. Cognitive biases may therefore lead to atypical or inhibited 
patterns of social and cognitive processing. 
Further investigation of the factors underlying the development and maintenance of cognitive 
biases may shed light on how these patterns are impacted, especially as they relate to atypical 
and systematic differences in social and emotional processing. In the current study, we will 
explore multiple sources of evidence for insight into how the existing models of cognitive biases 
may inform which procedures should be used to measure cognitive biases. In doing so, we will 
address how cognitive biases might relate to broad social, emotional, and behavioral 
characteristics which have been associated with atypical perceptual outcomes. 
The social world is a complex, dynamic environment which offers continuous and often 
unpredictable sensory information. To make sense of this information, automatic processes 
underlying our sensory systems are regularly engaged to counterbalance some of the limitations 
to conscious processing. Often measured using priming techniques, whereby the presentation of 
a stimulus biases further processing of related stimuli, automatic processes such as unconscious 
attention can arise to improve processing speed, for example (Wheatley & Wegner, 2001). 
Complex sensory inputs which carry dynamic social meaning can thus engage automatic 
processes, such that cognitive resources are conserved to manage other complex sources of input 
without conscious input. Cognitive biases fall into line with these more automatic processes, 
which can develop to deal with highly familiar and easily recognized inputs (National Research 
Council, 2015). Our sensory systems come to rely on automatic processes, including cognitive 
biases, to efficiently adapt and respond to changes in the environment. 
Efficiency in information processing can allow an individual to be more successful in a given 
social environment (Grill-Spector, Weiner, Kay, & Gomez, 2017), which in turn generates a 
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cyclically impactful increase in adaptive social behavior (Haselton, Nettle, & Murray, 2015). 
Previous evidence shows that perceptions and the subsequent decisions made on basis of those 
perceptions can occur more quickly if there are automatic processes already in place, regardless 
of whether those processes adhere to typical and rational functioning (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). As a result, automatic processes allow meaningful conclusions to be drawn in response to 
inputs and experiences which can occur even outside of the bounds of conscious attention. The 
more automatic aspects of processing are not fully understood, but they are hypothesized to arise 
due to influence from separate neural networks (Badgaiyan, 2012). 
The emotional behavior of others is a substantive contributor to the complexity of 
information available from the social environment. Including facial expressions and gestures, 
emotional behavior is used to convey information about the internal states and intentions of 
others. A vital aspect of social functioning therefore relies on the efficient and accurate 
perception of dynamic emotional inputs. As our sensory systems develop from infancy through 
adulthood, cumulative experience with perceiving and responding to emotional faces can have 
further impacts to face processing later in development. The adaptive and automatic application 
of previous experiences allows meaningful information to be attributed to a given input (Scott & 
Monesson, 2009). The more automatic processes involved in social communication and emotion 
processing are inherently more subject to bias, due to the judgment-based categorization of 
inputs which occur rapidly to deal with incoming information.  
1.1 Cognitive Biases and Social Perception 
The perception of information indeed defines how it may be judged; however, perception 
also defines how we decide to interact with others. In the absence of a typical stream of social 
inputs, such as in circumstances of social isolation, even aspects of perception which are not 
typically entirely reliant on social input can be negatively impacted. Social isolation has been 
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attributed to reduced cognitive performance overall, in addition to disruptions in executive 
functioning (Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009). Three domains of social ability which are 
fundamental to survival are impacted in particular (Brownlee, 2013), which result in cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral difficulties due social isolation (Haney, 2018). The perception of 
social input is vital to how individuals will use adaptive strategies to navigate the social world, 
and whether maladaptive and atypical biases emerge in processing strategies. There are several 
accepted models currently in place to explain the outstanding question of how cognitive biases 
develop and are maintained. We will first consider the adaptive mechanisms which can give rise 
to cognitive biases, followed by the maladaptive and potentially deregulatory processes which 
can arise in social and perceptual domains. 
1.1.1 Adaptive Mechanisms 
Cognitive theories which explain the mechanisms underlying cognitive biases are generally 
predicated on the assumption that adaptive responses can facilitate efficient and accurate 
processing. These adaptive processes are formed from the substrate of perception and perceptual 
judgments (Tucker & Luu, 2007), and in turn function to derive meaning from complex inputs. 
Cognitive biases may therefore also function to prime our sensory systems to capture 
information that is highly relevant, or can be quickly processed due to its familiarity. The 
automaticity of cognitive biases, however, can disrupt some of the typical processing strategies 
most people use. For example, if there are underlying disruptions to typical and rational 
functioning, the adaptive response underlying biased processing of relevant information instead 
drives a maladaptive or irrational focus on negative information, such as the cognitive biases 
seen in major depressive disorders (MDD). Deregulation in the ability to access and to form 
novel positive perceptual judgments may lead to severe impacts to social outcomes, and further 
drive negative biases over time. 
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Indeed, the automatic processes underlying cognitive biases can function to develop and 
maintain certain atypical behavioral tendencies and preoccupations. As another example beyond 
MDD, the fear of social failure is a common preoccupation for many individuals with social 
anxiety disorders. Negative cognitive biases for social information are often observed, where 
negative social outcomes are expected to a higher degree of probability compared to judgments 
by neurotypical peers (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranengurg, & van Ijzendoorn, 
2007; Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999). Cognitive models of anxiety disorders propose that 
the automatic and selective processing of threat-related, in this case anxiety-related and social 
information, contributes to the core features used to characterize anxiety (Liu, Li, Han, & Liu, 
2017). In terms of daily functioning, an over-reliance on negative social information and 
ignorance of social inputs can limit the scope of an individual's social experience. Previous 
evidence has shown that individuals with social anxiety disorder rated negative social outcomes 
as being more probable and costly, compared to ratings by neurotypicals peers (Rheingold, 
Herbert, & Franklin, 2003). In another study of social anxiety, anxious individuals also showed  
an atypical presentation of cognitive biases for threatening social information (Asmundson & 
Stein, 1994), findings similar to which have been widely replicated (for a review, see Bar-Haim 
et al. 2007). Cognitive biases may indeed arise due to adaptive mechanisms, which can be 
deregulated to drive maladaptive responses. This interpretation would suggest that cognitive 
biases may play a substantive role in how individuals perceive and respond to the social world.  
1.1.2 Evolutionary Mechanisms 
The mechanisms underlying cognitive biases have also been suggested to arise due to 
biological predispositions, or from evolutionary mechanisms. Considering the evolutionary 
model, cognitive biases may explain why the adaptive and automatic aspects which are seen in 
typical, rational processing seem to become dysregulated. Survival, broadly termed, is predicated 
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by the ability to identify and respond to danger. Survival is also supported by the automatic 
processes our sensory systems develop to resolve the complexity of inputs from the environment. 
Cognitive biases may thus contribute, due to the involvement of evolutionary mechanisms, to a 
priming of cognitive efficiency for certain types of information. Although a unified 
understanding of cognitive biases must acknowledge that they can occur due to processes which 
deviate from rationality, in essence as cognitive errors, this suggestion would imply an adaptive 
process is underlying cognitive biases as well. Through the evolutionary lens, cognitive biases 
are understood to promote survival in some cases, which are outlined below (Haselton, Nettle, & 
Murray, 2015). The departure from rational functioning which characterizes some cognitive 
biases is hypothesized to arise from evolutionary mechanisms which would otherwise improve 
information processing (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). The evolutionary model describes 
cognitive biases as a consequence of once-adaptive mechanisms, even though the processes may 
not be adaptive in a given environment, for every individual, or at a certain time-point in our 
evolutionary progression.  
1.2 Outcomes of Cognitive Biases 
We further explore the previously outlined adaptive and maladaptive impacts of cognitive 
biases. Given the wide range of processes and outcomes associated with cognitive biases, we will 
focus on social and behavioral outcomes associated with cognitive biases and their impact to 
perception. 
1.2.1 Biased Perception of Threat 
We have previously outlined cognitive mechanisms which allow an individual to actively and 
even unconsciously respond to changes in a given environment. However, as described with 
respect to the evolutionary model of cognitive biases, processes which were once adaptive may 
be inappropriate to respond to a given environment or problem. One clear example of an 
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adaptive cognitive biases, the auditory looming effect, describes a biased processing pattern 
whereby individuals preferentially process information that is judged to be closer in physical 
proximity compared to information outside of that judged proximity. For example, neurotypicals 
judged a sound with increasing intensity as being physically closer and more rapid in approach 
as compared to a sound with decreasing intensity (Neuhoff, 2001). The auditory looming effect 
has also been shown to be more pronounced for individuals who were in poorer physical 
condition by fitness and heart-rate outcomes compared to healthy controls; this association 
suggests a protective factor or mechanism may drive the individual to adapt to dynamic changes 
in the environment (Neuhoff, 2016). The perception of threat, and the automatic processes which 
develop to quickly perceive threatening information, may therefore drive cognitive biases for 
certain inputs compared to others (Haselton, Nettle, & Murray, 2015). 
1.2.2 Biased Perception of Relevance 
Automatic cognitive process similar to those underlying the perception of threat may also 
drive the perception of an input's relevance. For example, the biological relevance of a given 
stimulus plays an important role in the processing strategies that will be used, and this factor 
closely relates the modern social world to some evolutionary biases. From infancy, our sensory 
systems are predisposed to attend more to human compared to non-human faces (Farroni, et al., 
2005; Johnson, Senju, & Tomalski, 2015). In adulthood, we are similarly primed to attend more 
to certain faces, and will show cognitive biases for infant faces compared to adult faces (Brosch, 
Sander, & Scherer, 2007). Interestingly, adults show more activity in reward-centered brain 
regions when viewing infant faces compared to adult faces (Kringelbach, et al., 2008), which 
might seem to suggest at the involvement of a reciprocal relationship which arose due to the 
biological relevance of the infants and the social relevance of the face more generally. Two 
different cognitive biases, in infancy and adulthood, therefore may work in symbiosis to support 
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the survival and fitness of infants, who are often considered vulnerable and important members 
within the social world of adults. To the typical observer, human faces are not inherently 
threatening, therefore these biases are generally adaptive to social functioning and promote 
positive social interactions because they carry such high relevance for social functioning. 
1.2.3 Biased Processing of Experience 
Fitness and survival within a social environment depend on the ability and willingness to 
engage with others. Our sensory systems operate by bridging associations between inputs and 
expectations, and rely on knowledge bases built through experience. Commonly referred to as 
priors, these knowledge bases can be used to inform perception and subsequent perceptual 
decisions (Lee & Vanpaemel, 2018). Considering priors through the Bayesian account of 
cognitive biases, the adaptive processes we use to navigate the social world rely on previous 
experiences and judgments (Pellicano & Burr, 2012). Perceptual errors may occur in the absence 
of sufficient priors, however an over-reliance on priors may similarly lead to perceptual errors or 
atypical processing strategies. Cognitive biases are therefore impacted by the ability to perceive 
input, and can also contribute to how previous knowledge is used to inform the current 
processing strategy. Through the Bayesian account, cognitive biases may be attributed to an 
adaptive attempt to use previous experience, relying on priors to inform perception and the 
subsequent decisions made to adapt to a given environment.  
1.2.4 Biased Processing of Rationality 
As previously outlined, cognitive biases are perhaps most widely understood as processing 
errors, which deviate from rational functioning. In models of major clinical disorders, cognitive 
biases have been implicated in many of the behaviors and characteristics used to characterize 
symptoms. Despite the adaptive and protective factors which can give rise to cognitive biases, 
making consistent 'errors' in reasoning to preferentially capture some inputs while ignoring 
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others can negatively impact how one perceives to the social world (Liss, Saulnier, Fein, & 
Kinsbourne, 2006). Interpreting cognitive biases through this mechanistic lens suggests that they 
may similarly drive tertiary traits and symptoms, which will be discussed in more detail below 
with respect to several clinical disorders.  
1.3 Cognitive Biases in Major Clinical Disorders 
In light of the well-established impact of information processing abilities on perceptual 
outcomes, researchers have become increasingly preoccupied with investigating the impact to 
social outcomes. Specifically, whether cognitive biases may be used to explain the development 
and maintenance of core features of major clinical disorders. For example, cognitive biases have 
been identified in clinical individuals as a bias for perceiving threatening, negative, and/or 
disorder-related information. As a result, the presence of cognitive biases has been implicated in 
maintaining the characteristics of anxiety disorders (Aday & Carlson, 2017; Bradley B. P., 
Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Dudeney, Sharpe, & Hunt, 2015; Eldar, et al., 2012; Hollocks, 
Ozivadjian, Mathews, Howlin, & Simonoff, 2013; Klein, et al., 2018; Lisk, Vaswani, Linetzky, 
Bar-Haim, & Lau, 2020). Similar implications have been made for addictive disorders (Wiers, 
Gladwin, Hofmann, Salemink, & Ridderinkof, 2013), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; 
(Badura-Brack, et al., 2013), eating disorders (Mercado, Schmidt, O'Daly, Cambell, & 
Werthmann, 2020; Misener & Libben, 2020; Voon, 2015; Williamson, Muller, Reas, & Thaw, 
1999), and MDD (Bergman, et al., 2020). Each of these disorders typically includes a 
characteristic reliance on negative and disorder-related information, driving further negative 
outcomes and experiences. Although the mechanisms which give rise to cognitive biases can be 
explained through processes which facilitate survival, disruptions to processing strategies are 
widely understood to occur alongside some of the core features of clinical disorders. The cyclical 
impact of cognitive biases is well-exemplified in models of anxiety disorders in particular, where 
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individuals interpret social situations as being more negative compared to neurotypical peers, 
pay more attention to negative social information compared to positive, and continue to have 
difficulty with perceiving and interpreting positivity from social inputs (Beck & Clark, 1997). 
1.3.1 Cognitive Biases in Neurodevelopmental Disorders 
A key feature of many neurodevelopmental disorders is having difficulty shifting cognitive 
resources, such as attention, away from certain inputs and toward others. Similar to their 
proposed role in psychoaffective disorders such as anxiety, cognitive biases have also been 
proposed to explain some of the processing strategies used and social characteristics displayed 
by individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders. As an example, individuals with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) show cognitive biases for negative information (Melvyn, 
Chow, Vallabhajosyula, & Fung, 2020). Similar effects have also been reported to underlie 
problems with internalizing and externalizing which are commonly reported in association with 
other neurodevelopmental delays (Schmidt & Vereenooghe, 2020).  
Other researchers, however, suggest that cognitive biases may arise due to artifacts from 
research methodology itself. In particular, that the inappropriate attribution of typical standards 
to populations for which they are not intended may lead to measurement artifacts (Haselton, 
Nettle, & Murray, 2015). Exploring this potential issue, researchers sought to identify whether 
cognitive biases were correlated with intelligence in a group of individuals with 
neurodevelopmental disorders. Indeed, deviations from rational thinking did correlate with 
intelligence, however only when a higher degree of cognitive ability or engagement was required 
to carry out the task (Stanovich & West, 2008). In light of the potential disparity between an 
individual's functional abilities demands of the typical or normative standards of measurement, 
whether cognitive biases are indeed artifacts of research methodology or arise due to underlying 
processing differences remains unclear. 
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As it stands, few studies incorporate appropriate methodology appropriate for assessing 
individuals with severe neurodevelopmental disorders, or choose to include 
neurodevelopmentally delayed individuals as participants. The resulting dearth of research into 
this important area was recently outlined in a review paper; a majority of the studies reviewed 
were found to have excluded individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders from participation 
(Schmidt & Vereenooghe, 2020), despite being in the position to benefit the most from more in-
depth investigations into cognitive biases. Therefore, individuals with limited social, cognitive, 
and/or behavioral capacity can be systematically excluded from participation in the inquiries that 
should instead shed light on how biases in cognitive processing may impact multiple 
presentations of social functioning. 
1.3.2 Cognitive Biases in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
We have discussed the impact of cognitive biases in explanatory models of a range of 
neurotypical and clinical samples. Most germane to the present study, however, are the impacts 
of cognitive biases to some of the core and often debilitating features of autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD). ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder which impacts social communication 
and behavior, with diagnostic criteria for ASD currently including persistent impairments to 
social interaction and communication abilities, in addition to restricted and repetitive patterns of 
behavior, and unusual sensory interests (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). ASD 
symptoms and traits may have negative consequences on the ability to respond and relate to 
others; autistic individuals often struggle with emotion recognition and with interpreting the 
facial expressions of others, characteristic difficulties which have been linked with social 
communication skills more generally (Baron-Cohen, Golan, & Ashwin, 2009). Autistic 
individuals also show differences in social attention, however mixed evidence has yet to 
establish whether this could be due to a reduction in social orienting abilities (Dawson, et al., 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
2004; Guillon, Hadjikhani, Baduel, & Roge, 2014), or whether other mechanisms dictate social 
attention in association with ASD. 
Cognitive biases for social information have been documented in ASD throughout various 
developmental stages. Taking the example of a free play scenario, autistic infants as young as 20 
months have shown atypical social orientation, looking more frequently and for longer durations 
toward objects instead of people as compared to neurotypical peers (Swettenham, et al., 1998). 
This atypical social orientation was somewhat preserved, as by two years of age, autistic toddlers 
have shown difficulty following the gaze of others; interestingly, however, their ability to 
process directional information based on gaze was intact (Chawarska, Klin, & Volkmar, 2003). 
In older autistic toddlers, around 32 months, poorer face recognition abilities have been 
attributed to disruptions in attention, where autistic toddlers attended less to faces as compared to 
neurotypical controls (Chawarska, Volkmar, & Klin, 2010). Shifting throughout development, by 
5 to 12 years of age, autistic children have shown intact social orientation and attentional 
mechanisms pertaining to social stimuli (Fischer, Koldewyn, Jiang, & Kanwisher, 2014). In 
adulthood, reduced social orientation and attention have been widely demonstrated (Moore, 
Heavey, & Reidy, 2012). Taken together, these mixed findings for cognitive biases and how they 
may shift across developmental stages highlight some of the challenges to the current 
investigations of processing biases more broadly, especially when comparing across studies. To 
offer a unified understanding of how cognitive biases are impacted and maintained in association 
with ASD appears to necessitate an approach from the perspective of multiple developmental 
stages, alongside multiple presentations of neurodevelopmental differences. 
Despite the wealth of inconsistencies in the literature regarding cognitive biases and their 
specific impact to ASD, sensory perception and cognitive processing more generally are well 
known to be impacted in ASD. The mechanisms underlying this impact and the extent to which 
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they dictate social and behavioral outcomes core to ASD remain unclear. A recent review 
described mixed evidence across a variety of paradigms as to whether significant differences 
could be found in cognitive biases between autistic individuals and neurotypical peers (Bergman, 
et al., 2020). Although the severity of ASD symptoms in these studies were largely found to be 
unrelated to cognitive biases across various paradigms, the review showed very few studies 
achieved adequate methodological quality. Due to methodological discrepancies with sample 
size, data reporting, and task demands, the researchers cited difficulty in reaching a unified 
understanding of whether cognitive biases differed across groups, and if so, what these 
differences may reveal about the underlying processes. Considering these issues in comparisons 
across and within paradigms, we agree it may be difficult to find a true effect if one does exist 
for cognitive biases, even if there are widely documented differences in perception more 
generally between autistic individuals and neurotypical peers.  
Social information is indeed vital to adaptive functioning in the social world, however for 
autistic individuals and individuals with profound social and behavioral challenges, social 
experiences can be threatening, negative, or even aversive (Edmiston, Jones, & Corbett, 2016). 
One model which endeavors to explain processes underlying the social and cognitive differences 
in ASD is the eye avoidance hypothesis. The eye avoidance hypothesis describes the tendency 
for autistic individuals to systematically miss out on important social information when input 
from the eye region of a face (Tanaka & Sung, 2016). Attributed to the perceived level of threat 
in the eye region, information in this area can be systematically avoided, oriented away from, or 
ignored when autistic individuals view a face. Per this model, some of the profound face 
processing differences commonly reported in ASD may arise due to protective or adaptive 
factors. However, in combination with the other characteristic difficulties in ASD, the adaptive 
response may manifest as an atypical cognitive bias away from the eye region in order to avoid 
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the threatening information (Jones, Carr, & Klin, 2008). Indeed often described as a social deficit 
in ASD, reduced attention and orientation toward the eye region may serve as a protective 
response to threat, however can also aggravate social deficits when other social inputs are 
systematically avoided from this important social area. To illustrate the dual role of cognitive 
biases in some of the adaptive and maladaptive features of ASD, we will describe additional 
processing strategies common to autistic individuals. These strategies include the enhanced drive 
to seek out explanatory information when faced with ambiguous circumstances, however only 
for circumstances related to physical, but not social stimuli (Rutherford & Subiaul, 2016). 
Autistic individuals also tend to process details within a scene more accurately compared to 
neurotypicals, however often have difficulty using contextual information to draw meaning about 
the overall scene whereas neurotypicals rely on context (Skewes, Jegindo, & Gebauer, 2015). 
Together, these differences in processing strategies might suggest at the impact that the 
interpretation of a given input impacts whether responses manifest with an adaptive, or 
maladaptive outcome. 
An important limitation to a large portion of the current cognitive bias research is that studies 
rarely account for potential differences in cognitive biases over time, or at different time-points 
in viewing given stimuli. For example, with respect to the eye avoidance hypothesis in ASD, the 
underlying assumptions which predicate the theory do not take into account where attention is 
allocated when the eye region is avoided. The theory does account for a reduction in visual 
attention to the eye region, however does not demonstrate how visual attention changes over 
time and in its allocation outside of this region. More specifically, to say an individual avoided 
the eye region does not differentiate whether there was an active engagement of attention away 
from the eye region, or whether a more passive seeking of neutral information occurred instead. 
Looking to findings which show a reduction in eye movements (EM) made toward the eye 
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region in ASD, a conclusion that the eyes were actively avoided may be supported; however, 
looking to findings which show an increase in EM toward the mouth region would instead seem 
to support a conclusion of passively seeking the neutral information (Neumann, Spezio, Piven, & 
Adolphs, 2006). Systematic avoidance of the eye region, regardless of its motivational 
foundations, may deprive an individual of important social information over time and maintain 
the eye-avoidant response. Considering the different factors which may drive the eye avoidance 
cognitive bias, it becomes difficult to conclude whether cognitive biases represent more active or 
passive adaptation on behalf of the individual.  
Growing interest in the relationship between face processing and ASD has led to 
investigations of how cognitive biases might be specifically associated with the core social and 
emotional features of ASD. Several theories which explain the mechanisms involved in ASD 
symptoms and traits highlight how cognitive biases may lead to difficulty understanding, and 
unwillingness to seek out social information. A child with social difficulties who develops many 
negative associations, emotions, and responses to social stimuli may go on to struggle with social 
interactions later in life, and maintain further negative experiences. The maladaptive and 
protective factors which play into typical processing strategies, and how these factors may be 
atypical in ASD remain unclear. Researchers have suggested that the severity of ASD is 
associated with a reduced ability to understand the emotions and intentions of others (Ryan & 
Charragain, 2010). Further, face processing differences are also seen in individuals with 
subclinical levels of autism-like traits (Dickter, Burk, Fleckenstein, & Kozikowski, 2018). 
Largely, however, the manner in which the features of ASD and cognitive biases relate in autistic 
individuals and those with ASD traits is also unknown.  
1.3.3 Cognitive Biases and Autistic Traits 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
The social impacts previously discussed in clinical ASD are often present in neurotypicals to 
varying degrees, manifesting as similar social and behavioral profiles to clinical presentations of 
ASD to a lesser degree of severity. An emerging framework for understanding ASD emphasizes 
that traits, behaviors, and tendencies relating to ASD are in fact present at varying degrees in all 
individuals; this view accounts for a transdiagnostic framework of addressing ASD traits outside 
of the conceptual structure of ASD diagnoses (Mandy, 2018). Formerly, ASD has previously 
been defined to span a collection of related disorders where individuals share a constellation of 
social and behavioral characteristics (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). ASD is currently 
characterized by the presence of persistent difficulties with social communication and 
interaction, in addition to restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, with the inclusion of unusual 
sensory processing (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Looking toward how social and 
behavioral profiles vary across a broader range of individuals, similar constellations of traits to 
those characterizing ASD can also be observed. More recently, cantilevered investigations have 
gone beyond this formal definition of ASD to examine how traits relating to ASD impact 
individuals who do not have clinical diagnoses. Studies including neurotypicals as participants 
have become increasingly common, adding a nuanced line of research to examine the 
mechanisms underlying the core features of ASD using a transdiagnostic approach. As our 
understanding of these mechanisms is currently unclear, so too is our understanding of which 
factors influence ASD traits and their impact to cognitive processing. Extending investigations to 
a broader range of individuals in order to compare cognitive biases along a more inclusive 
spectrum may indeed advance research into the factors which contribute to the core features 
associated with ASD. 
Predicating the transdiagnostic view, research did identify individuals with a greater 
likelihood of displaying ASD traits. Early on, autism researchers noted a general constellation of 
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social and behavioral features which could be seen more commonly among family members of 
autistic individuals compared to the general population. Relatives showed higher rates of social, 
cognitive, and behavioral differences, deficits, and/or tendencies which resembled those of 
autistic family members (Gerdts & Bernier, 2011; Kanner, 1943). ASD-related features included 
developmental delays, social difficulties, and atypical processing patterns (Kanner, 1943), 
alongside difficulties reciprocating social behavior, social communication, and restricted and 
repetitive behaviors (Constantino & Todd, 2003). A more modern approach to the dimensional 
view which categorizes individuals as autistic and nonautistic seeks to consider a continuous 
distribution of traits from those considered neurotypical through to clinical populations 
diagnosed with ASD (Constantino & Todd, 2003).  
Various self-report tools have been developed to assess the level of ASD traits in individuals 
with and without diagnoses of ASD, which allows a continuous distribution of scores to be 
obtained along the broad spectrum of ASD features. ASD traits commonly assessed include poor 
planning skills and attentional inflexibility (Hughes, Leboyer, & Bouvard, 1997), a reduced 
ability to integrate information during processing (Stewart & Ota, 2008), and a weak central 
coherence or local processing bias (Happe & Frith, 2006). Previous evidence has shown there 
were no differences in the categorization of visual stimuli between neurotypicals with high and 
low levels of ASD traits, respectively, however higher traits corresponded with the tendency to 
rely less on prior perceptual knowledge to do so (Skewes, Jegindo, & Gebauer, 2015). Therefore, 
perceptual differences have been demonstrated, however visual biases more generally remain 
unclear. This difference in the use of priors to inform perception has been attributed to the 
modulation of perception by cognitive biases, such that processing strategies may vary as a 
function of ASD traits. Other evidence establishes the link between higher levels of ASD traits 
and atypical social processing in terms of cognitive perspective taking (Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, 
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& Viding, 2013). There is conflicting evidence to this link which suggests that ASD traits do not 
influence emotional processing in neurotypicals (Greene, Suess, & Kelly, 2020), and that 
emotional processing abilities are unimpacted in ASD (Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 
2013). It therefore remains an outstanding challenge to disentangle how ASD traits might impact 
social, cognitive, and emotional processing in neurotypicals and along the continuum of ASD 
characteristics. Further, it remains unknown whether this information might be used to inform 
our understanding of ASD traits and features. Indirect evidence for the link between cognitive 
biases and ASD traits in neurotypicals might help to shed light on the current questions. 
Importantly, it might inform how commonly used paradigms and procedures might be adapted 
for use with a wide range of individuals, such that a more continuous distribution of ASD 
features can be investigated along a transdiagnostic view.
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Chapter 2 
2 Indices of Cognitive Biases 
Perhaps due to the fact that they have been widely described across almost every aspect of 
human cognition, cognitive biases have similarly been measured across a myriad of paradigms 
and tasks. In Chapter 1, we have outlined broad processes which define and are hypothesized to 
give rise to cognitive biases. We now focus on the methods of measurement which have been 
commonly applied to investigate cognitive biases. Several ranging review studies have identified 
inconsistencies in cognitive biases across and even within common paradigms (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Brooks, Prince, Stahl, Campbell, & Treasure, 2011; Cisler & Koster, 2010; MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986). These discrepancies have made it difficult to bring together a unified 
understanding of how cognitive biases impact social and emotional processing, let alone how the 
processes which give rise to them may impact our daily perceptions and cognitions. More 
difficult still is attempting to understand cognitive biases and their impact to individuals with 
major clinical, neurodevelopmental, and/or affective differences compared to neurotypical peers.  
2.1 Tools to Measure Cognitive Biases 
There are a number of common paradigms used to measure cognitive biases, considering the 
wealth of cognitive domains in which they have been observed. For the current assessment, we 
will focus on common procedures which have been used to measure cognitive biases for 
emotional faces. 
2.1.1 The Dot-Probe Paradigm 
The dot-probe paradigm is one of the most common tools used to assess cognitive biases in a 
variety of cognitive domains, including visual attention. Seminally published in 1986, the dot-
probe paradigm was first described as a tool to measure cognitive biases by comparing 
differences in response latency to a visual target (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). A target, 
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the dot probe, is typically presented on either side of a central fixation. Participants respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible by indicating the location of the dot probe. Importantly, before 
each appearance of the dot probe, a pair of task-irrelevant distractor stimuli are presented. In 
most versions of the dot-probe paradigm, emotional faces are included as the distractor stimuli to 
represent the true experimental manipulation; different responses to the dot probe as a function 
of the emotional faces which preceded it are commonly compared. One stimulus in the pair has a 
manipulated characteristic (e.g., emotional facial expression) which ostensibly induces biased 
processing toward or away from the image. Biases for the stimuli will impact response latencies 
during dot-probe trials in which the dot probe appears in the same location the distractor 
previously occupied. Response latencies will be faster for probes replacing the stimuli garnering 
the bias, if cognitive biases do exist to be measured. 
For example, distractor pairs typically feature juxtaposed pairings of social and non-social 
stimuli, such as faces and objects, or social stimuli which vary in relevance, such as emotional 
and neutral faces. Previous evidence suggests that social information is preferentially processed 
in most neurotypicals (Morrisey, Reed, McIntosh, & Rutherford, 2018), therefore dot probes 
which appear in the previous location of a highly emotional face would be hypothesized to 
garner faster response latencies compared to a neutral face. Neurotypicals have been shown to 
display this pattern of cognitive biases during the dot-probe paradigm, with faster reactions for 
highly social and emotional stimuli (for a review, see van Rooijen, Ploeger, & Kret, 2017). 
Though our understanding of cognitive biases is currently limited by mixed findings, the dot-
probe paradigm has arisen as the most commonly used measure of cognitive biases. Some 
researchers consider the dot-probe paradigm as the gold standard for research into biases in 
attention and other processes, given its high adaptability to different design parameters to address 
sources of cognitive biases. 
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2.1.2 Beyond the Dot-Probe Paradigm 
The dot-probe paradigm is beneficial for widespread use because it is easy to conduct, and 
therefore should offer highly adaptable methodology. The added benefit of malleable task 
demands to allow participation from individuals with a range of cognitive abilities. However, the 
traditional dot-probe paradigm is somewhat limited by several factors. First, although the task is 
perhaps well-suited for use with a wide range of populations, a key issue for expanding use of 
the dot-probe paradigm with clinical populations is the fact that most paradigms incorporate 
highly social stimuli, which often featuring direct eye contact and/or gaze. For individuals with 
severe social anxiety or neurodevelopmental disorders which impact social abilities, highly 
social stimuli may be perceived as more threatening, aversive, or negative compared to 
neurotypical peers. Direct eye contact is particularly difficult for autistic individuals (Tanaka & 
Sung, 2016), which presents a problem for use with the dot-probe paradigm as direct eye contact 
can increase recognition and impact neural processing of emotions (Striano, Koop, Grossman, & 
Reid, 2006). Second, the dot-probe paradigm may be limited by a myopic measure of cognitive 
biases, in using only a single response time (RT) index. This latency to target detection therefore 
measures cognitive biases as an aggregate across trials of single points in time per trial, rather 
than a continuous stream of data. Further, the RT measure does not take into account whether 
participants make any changes in eye movements toward the stimuli, nor whether the stimuli are 
being captured in the visual field at all. Some researchers do incorporate task instructions which 
require eye movements, to ensure differences can be measured in attentional capture between the 
stimuli, (Valuch & Kulke, 2020), however the majority of dot-probe studies use the RT index as 
a freestanding measure of cognitive bias. Third, recent investigations have pointed out 
inconsistent findings across studies using the dot-probe paradigm, putting the gold standard 
nomenclature largely up for debate (e.g., Price, et al., 2015; Sears, Quigley, Fernandez, Newman, 
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& Dobson, 2019; Skinner, Olson, & Meltzoff, 2019; Thigpen, Forest Gruss, Garcia, Herring, & 
Keil, 2018). The dot-probe paradigm has been described to have low reproducibility and 
reliability (Waechter & Stolz, 2015; and for a review of the impact of low reliability on cognitive 
bias scores, see Rodebaugh, et al., 2016) which renders potential comparisons and adaptations to 
clinical populations a more difficult endeavor. 
Considering these limitations, the dot-probe paradigm is perhaps not currently well-suited for 
use with autistic individuals, those who have disruptions to social abilities, who are very young, 
or struggle to comply with written and verbal instructions. Previous researchers have urged 
future studies to incorporate a combination of multiple methods to measure cognitive biases 
(Rodebaugh, et al., 2016), in order to address some of the limitations to reliability of traditional 
procedures. It is therefore appropriate to look beyond the dot-probe paradigm to procedures 
which might enhance the traditional measurements, or extend investigations into cognitive biases 
in individuals with a range of cognitive and social abilities. Further, given the wide variety of 
domains and populations along which they have been documented, it is important to examine 
whether the existing measurements may be consolidated. Given the limitations to use of the dot-
probe paradigm with some clinical populations, we agree that multiple methods should be 
combined to address potentially substantive methodological concerns put forth about the validity 
and reliability of the task. 
2.1.3 Eye Tracking 
In light of these concerns, we sought to identify whether patterns of cognitive biases during 
the dot-probe paradigm could be replicated using concurrent eye tracking procedures. This aim 
may represent a move toward incorporating a naturalistic approach to measuring cognitive biases 
compared to the traditional dot-probe paradigm. Eye movements generally represent overt 
attentional processes more accurately compared to the covert attention required for downstream 
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production of an RT response (Weirich, 1981). Eye tracking may therefore represent a measure 
of cognitive biases which more closely tracks various attentional processes underlying cognitive 
biases. Eye tracking has been incorporated more frequently to address some of the 
aforementioned limitations to RT-based procedures (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012), including the 
dot-probe paradigm (Valuch & Kulke, 2020). 
Eye tracking has been used to measure cognitive biases in individuals for whom the 
traditional dot-probe paradigm is perhaps inaccessible or inappropriate. For example, cognitive 
biases have been investigated with eye movements in infants (Leppanen, 2016) and young 
children (Kooiker, Pel, van der Steen-Kant, & van der Steen, 2016), individuals with PTSD 
(Kimble, Fleming, Bandy, Kim, & Zambetti, 2010), and autistic individuals with co-occurring 
depression (Bergman, et al., 2020). Eye-tracking tasks are especially useful for populations such 
as the non-verbal, the very young, or those with inhibited development because it allows for the 
translation of higher task demands into paradigms requiring little to no cognitive and social 
requirements. This may serve to reduce artifacts which can commonly populate cognitive bias 
research (Haselton, Nettle, & Murray, 2015). Measuring participants' eye movements for the 
duration of a stimulus viewing period, together with examining eye movements outside of this 
period, may offer a continuous stream of eye movement data to be related to RT-based cognitive 
biases within a predetermined stimulus viewing period. 
Eye tracking measures of cognitive biases typically assess the difference in eye movements 
between social and non-social objects or between different kinds of emotional faces (Sears, 
Quigley, Fernandez, Newman, & Dobson, 2019), however reliability of these indices across 
different tasks remains relatively unclear (Waechter & Stolz, 2015). The preferential-looking 
paradigm, for example, is highly useful for investigating cognitive biases in infants, but more 
complex studies of the perception of emotion in adults often incorporate a cognitive demand to 
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the task, such as RT measures in response to various stimuli (Sears, Quigley, Fernandez, 
Newman, & Dobson, 2019). 
Eye tracking studies of cognitive biases typically consider three basic measurements, 
including whether there is a systematic bias in the initial allocation of gaze, i.e., the location of 
the first eye movement orientated toward the stimuli of interest. Additionally, bias can be 
measured as the maintained allocation of gaze, i.e., to the location of the most frequent eye 
movements. Another common measure of bias uses the duration of the total allocation of gaze, 
i.e., the location that received the longest duration of maintained eye movements. In essence, 
these measures are derived from the common investigation of the frequency and duration of eye 
movements to different areas of interest (AOI). Eye tracking analyses of cognitive biases using a 
combination of bias measurements with eye gaze allow for a more continuous view of how 
visual attention is allocated and may shift across a given stimulus presentation period. This 
approach may help to parse some of the processes which are hypothesized to underlie cognitive 
biases in early visual attention, from the processes which are associated with later perceptual 
biases. The current evidence supporting the use of eye tracking to measure cognitive biases is 
mixed, as many studies exert different parameters of experimental control with respect to eye 
movements, in addition to the issues with reliability in cognitive bias research which have been 
previously identified. Combining existing techniques to address some of the gaps which 
currently define our understanding of cognitive biases may offer insight into how RT-based and 
eye gaze measurements of early visual and later perceptual biases work concurrently and 
differently. Further, which aspects of the current methodology are indeed appropriate for a wider 
range of individuals, or which may have the potential to improve future investigations of 
cognitive biases are not well understood. We attempt to address these outstanding questions with 
respect to combining the dot-probe paradigm with concurrent eye tracking, in addition to going 
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beyond the traditional dot-probe methodology toward more widely-appropriate measures of 
cognitive biases. 
2.2 The Current Study 
Due to the prevalence with which it has been implemented, the dot-probe paradigm has 
undergone innumerable variations (van Rooijen, Ploeger, & Kret, 2017). Across studies, there is 
mixed evidence as to whether the dot-probe paradigm is indeed useful for measuring cognitive 
biases and importantly, for the accurate measurement of group differences in cognitive biases 
between clinical participants and neurotypicals. One meta-analysis of studies using the dot-probe 
paradigm suggests that the currently mixed evidence may arise at least in part due to 
methodological differences (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranengurg, & van 
Ijzendoorn, 2007). Across studies, the researchers identified broad evidence for the moderating 
impact of clinical compared to neurotypical status, of procedural timing, and on stimulus 
modality on the measured RT effect. 
Eye tracking studies of cognitive biases are gaining some momentum in the current literature; 
however, the findings as to whether group differences between ASD and neurotypicals in 
cognitive biases remain mixed. Percolating beneath the vast differences between studies are the 
potential for key methodological issues which would be beneficial to address. Given there are 
currently a dearth of studies controlling for eye movements during cognitive bias measurements 
such as the dot-probe paradigm, further research into combining these methods is required. Some 
consideration has been given to eye movements during the dot-probe paradigm, although few 
studies control for eye movements generally and fewer still measure them (but see Petrova, 
Wentura, & Bermeitinger, 2013). Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), or the time in between the 
appearance of the stimuli and the onset of the dot probe, has varied widely (SOA = 200-1250 ms) 
across different studies (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Sears, Quigley, Fernandez, 
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Newman, & Dobson, 2019). These differences make it difficult to draw direct comparisons of 
cognitive biases, however shorter SOAs are typically incorporated to control for the number of 
eye movements possible during a given trial. In contrast, longer SOAs have been hypothesized to 
diminish or obscure the measurable RT effect of cognitive biases for emotional faces due to an 
increase the potential error variance (Petrova et al., 2013; van Rooijen, Ploeger, & Kret, 2017). 
The intractable differences across studies and their associated findings make it difficult to 
consolidate a unified understanding of the processes underlying cognitive biases. In particular, 
differences in methodology such as longer SOAs, may lead to studies in which increased 
processing of a given stimulus represents cognitive bias, and other studies in which delayed 
disengagement of processing represents cognitive bias (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De 
Raedt, 2011). Changes in eye movements are hypothesized to precede changes in covert 
cognitive processing (Petrova, Wentura, & Bermeitinger, 2013), as visual attention is directed 
toward a given stimulus. It should thus follow that paradigms such as the dot-probe, which are 
assumed to provoke changes in cognitive processing style through the introduction of juxtaposed 
stimuli, should also produce dynamic eye movements between the stimuli. Consolidating these 
assumptions, cognitive biases measured using response latencies and cognitive biases measured 
using eye movements should reflect a similar pattern. However, with findings coming from 
studies addressing overt aspects of cognitive bias alongside covert biases which operate outside 
of cognitive awareness, these patterns remain difficult to align. Currently, few researchers 
control for eye movements during the dot-probe paradigm (but see (Petrova et al., 2013; Valuch 
& Kulke, 2020; Waechter & Stolz, 2015). For example, one study combined the dot-probe 
paradigm and eye tracking experiments to investigate cognitive biases, however this was 
conducted through distinct, rather than concurrent paradigms (Waechter & Stolz, 2015). This 
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reflects back on the important underlying issue at hand, with respect to drawing conclusions 
about cognitive biases across individuals with a variety of cognitive and social abilities.  
Although a modest number of studies have examined whether cognitive biases could be 
reliably measured using eye movements, little is known about how eye movements and thus 
directed visual attention impact cognitive biases across different methodologies, such as shorter 
and longer SOAs. As it stands, there is no solid evidence as to whether RT-based and eye 
movement-based measurements of cognitive biases are indeed assessing the same underlying 
construct. Taken together, there is some evidence for the association between increased cognitive 
biases, for example away from highly social information, and the core symptoms and traits 
associated with ASD. Other evidence suggests instead that autistic individuals can be less 
susceptible to some aspects of cognitive biases in rational thinking, and will exhibit less severe 
biases compared to neurotypicals (Morsanyi, 2010). Considering the lack of translational studies 
which directly compare cognitive biases in neurotypicals and autistic individuals, and the dearth 
of studies addressing sustained issues in comparing common methodologies, we examine the 
outstanding question of what role cognitive biases may play in social and perceptual abilities, 
especially as they relate to ASD.  
2.3 The Current Objectives 
In the current study, we dually attempted to validate existing measures of cognitive biases, 
and simultaneously address some of the overarching limitations to common paradigms used in 
neurotypicals and autistic individuals. We measured patterns of cognitive biases using RT-based 
and eye movement-based procedures concurrently, and then examined associations between the 
two measures and traits relating to ASD in neurotypicals. The general population shows a 
continuous distribution of ASD-related traits at varying degrees of severity; however, they are 
not debilitated by social and cognitive disruptions to the same level as some autistic individuals 
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might be. Direct measurement of ASD traits allows some level of inference to be made about 
their association to cognitive biases, along the relatively continuous distribution of traits we 
anticipate to measure using a sample from general population. Accessing this type of population 
for the current investigation allows us to concurrently use two common procedures, the dot-
probe paradigm and eye tracking, while still retaining some of the higher task demands (e.g., 
button press response to the location of a target) typically featured in the traditional dot-probe 
paradigm. Eye tracking elevates our ability to address cognitive biases further outside of the 
scope of a paradigm with high task demands, as it allows measurement of eye movements before 
the onset of the probe, and for the entire duration of a trial. We thus seek to consolidate some of 
the currently mixed evidence as to the role of cognitive biases in the social and cognitive features 
relating to ASD, in addition to how they might shed light on how common paradigms address 
issues with measuring cognitive biases.  
2.4 The Current Design 
To investigate cognitive biases in neurotypicals as they relate to ASD traits, we first 
employed two of the most common paradigms which are used to measure cognitive biases, the 
dot-probe paradigm and eye tracking. For the dot-probe paradigm, we also incorporated common 
methodological parameters as previously reviewed, including using different categories of 
emotional human faces as stimulus type, randomized and counterbalanced trial ordering between 
the emotions, and a relatively short SOA (200 ms). Using a shorter SOA controls for eye 
movements (van Rooijen, Ploeger, & Kret, 2017), and limits eye movements more closely in 
time to when the reaction time measures occurred. We derived RT bias scores from reaction 
times based on traditional procedures (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) between the two trial 
types (see Figures 1 and 2), which are described in detail in Chapter 3. Concurrent eye tracking 
was embedded within the dot-probe paradigm, which allowed for a continuous stream of eye 
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movements to stimuli to be measured during the dot-probe paradigm trials. We further used eye 
tracking to allow for gaze-contingent trial control, such that it was ensured participants were 
viewing the screen prior to the start of each trial. We did not otherwise control for eye 
movements, in terms of the location or direction instructed prior to the paradigm. 
From the dot-probe paradigm with concurrent eye tracking procedures, we derived two 
separate types of measurements for cognitive biases in our neurotypical sample. First, RT Bias 
scores were derived for each participant from the average response latency across all trials, and 
then used our eye tracking data to isolate response latencies across all trials in which eye 
movements were not made, to derive RTn Bias scores. Our assessments of the dot-probe 
paradigm trials with direct consideration of eye movements is a relatively novel approach (but 
see Petrova, Wentura, & Bermeitinger, 2013), which allows us to examine whether cognitive 
biases differ in the presence or absence of directed visual attention. Combination of the dot-
probe paradigm with concurrent eye tracking therefore allows more information to be gathered 
about patterns in cognitive biases across time during the stimulus presentation period, toward and 
away from different stimuli, and even covert biases which might contribute to the RT 
measurement even in the absence of eye movements. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Methods 
3.1 Participants 
An initial sample of neurotypical adults (N = 127; 90 females) with self-reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision was invited to participate through the undergraduate psychology 
research participant pool at the University of Western Ontario, in Canada. Participants provided 
written consent to take part in the study and were compensated with course credit (See Appendix 
A and B). Study approval was granted by the University of Western Ontario’s Research Ethics 
Board.  
Of the initial sample, data from 21 individuals had to be excluded listwise from further 
analyses due to eye tracker error (e.g., eye tracker malfunction, experimenter error, incomplete 
session). The final sample therefore included 106 participants (N = 72 females), who ranged in 
age from 17 to 46 years (with mean age M = 18.75 ± 3.14 years). We did not exclude 
participants on the basis of psychological diagnoses, based on the Research Diagnostic Criteria 
(RDoC) framework (Insel, et al., 2010). These criteria stipulate the inclusion of all individuals in 
studies relating to clinical symptomatology, to give a broad range and distribution of the 
variables of interest. Of our total sample, 18 participants disclosed they had previously received 
diagnoses for anxiety disorders, ten for MDD, six for ADHD, and two for obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD). None of the participants self-reported having previous diagnoses of ASD, but 
we did not exclude individuals from participation on the basis of ASD diagnosis. The majority of 
our sample (N = 70) therefore disclosed no previous diagnoses of the major psychopathologies 
previously listed, and none reported diagnoses of psycho-affective disorders including 
schizophrenia, eating disorders, or personality disorders. 
3.2 General Procedures 
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Participants completed an online self-administered questionnaire, which collected 
demographic information, in addition to a well-established measure of ASD traits. Participants 
then completed a single session of the dot-probe paradigm, the current gold standard for 
measuring cognitive biases to emotional stimuli, while reaction times and eye movements to the 
stimuli were recorded. We recorded these data to examine patterns of cognitive biases for 
different emotional faces, and related these biases to the presence and severity of ASD traits. We 
assessed ASD traits in our neurotypical population with the a priori expectations that trait levels 
would be approximately normally distributed in our sample, and that scores would correlate with 
a reduced, but not absent bias in the reaction time and eye movement data. Therefore, we 
hypothesized that emotional cognitive biases would be present in neurotypicals as has been 
previously discussed, but that the expected bias toward emotional compared to neutral faces 
would deviate in association with higher levels of self-reported ASD traits.  
3.3 ASD Traits: The Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) is a 50-item self-report tool used to assess the presence 
and severity of broad traits relating to ASD (Baron-Cohen, Golan, & Ashwin, 2009; see 
Appendix C for the full questionnaire). The traits assessed together describe a constellation of 
tendencies, behaviors, processes, and responses which resemble those used to diagnose and 
classify ASD. Studies show that traits measured using the AQ could be found with a relatively 
normally distribution in the general population (Hurst, Mitchell, Kimbrel, Kwapil, & Nelson-
Gray, 2007), and that commonly autistic individuals and their first-degree relatives will score 
higher on the AQ (Wheelwright, Auyeung, Allison, & Baron-Cohen, 2010; Zhang, Fung, & 
Smith, 2019). Using the AQ, ASD traits were quantified according to sum scores from the total 
number of items on the questionnaire, and/or according to five subscale scores. The subscales 
consisted of 10-item collections, which together related to social skills (e.g., difficulty making 
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new friends), attention switching (e.g., keeping track of multiple sources of conversation at the 
same time), attention to detail (e.g., noticing small features when others do not), communication 
(e.g., difficulty identifying and expressing emotions), and imagination (e.g., difficulty making up 
stories).  
Items on the AQ were scored on a four-point Likert response scale, where endorsements of 
the item statements ranged from definitely disagree and slightly disagree, to slightly agree and 
definitely agree (Stevenson & Hart, 2017). Half of the total items were framed such that 
individuals with higher ASD traits would endorse the statement (e.g., I find it difficult to work 
out others' intentions). The remaining half of the items were framed such that individuals with 
higher ASD traits would disagree with the statement (e.g., I find social situations easy). Total 
scores were derived from the sum of all item responses, which allows for a maximum score of 
150. The five subscales each had a maximum score of 30. Higher scores, for both total and 
subscale AQ measures, correspond to a greater degree of ASD traits. Cronbach's α for the test is 
.79 (Stevenson & Hart, 2017). Varied internal consistency has been measured between the five 
subscales (social skills = .75; attention switching = .61; attention to detail = .56, communication 
= .62, imagination = .46). The AQ has a high degree of specificity and sensitivity (each 95%) 
and has high test-retest reliability (R = .85).  
3.4 Cognitive Biases in the Eye-Tracked Dot-Probe Paradigm 
3.4.1 Materials 
The dot-probe paradigm was presented to participants during a single session with 240 test 
trials. The session took place in a light-controlled room. A portable Tobii Pro X3-120 screen-
based infrared eye tracker was used to track eye movements for the duration of the session. E-
Prime software (version #3.0.3.60; Psychology Software Tools, 2016) and Tobii Pro software 
extensions (Tobii Pro, version #3.2) were used to communicate onscreen stimuli and record eye 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
tracking data. Participants began the session seated approximately 60 cm away from a computer 
display monitor (Acer LCD, X223W) which had a refresh rate of 16.67 ms (60 Hz). The 
experimenter instructed participants to maintain a comfortable position with their heads on a chin 
rest, to control for large movements and changes in distance from the monitor. The eye tracker 
was affixed to the base of the monitor, operating at a sampling rate of 120 Hz. The experimenter 
performed guided calibration of the eye tracker for each participant, following a 9-point 
embedded calibration sequence to ensure accurate gaze capture. Participants completed practice 
trials orienting them to the requirements of the task, with no time limit.  
Stimuli presented during the dot-probe paradigm consisted of 48 portrait-style images of 
people with an emotional facial expression, selected from the NimStim Set of Facial Expressions 
(Tottenham, et al., 2009). The NimStim database controls for the sex, age, race, and rated 
intensity of the expression for the images, which was counterbalanced across our selection. For 
each emotion type, we selected eight images each of angry, calm, fearful, happy, and sad 
expressions, alongside a control set of neutral faces. For test trials during the dot-probe 
paradigm, a neutral face was always paired with an emotional face, and the order of presentation 
of the faces and emotions was randomized across trials.  
3.4.2 Procedures 
See Figures 1 and 2 for graphical representations of the two types of dot-probe paradigm 
trials, with the dot probe appearing in the same location as the emotional or neutral face. Trials 
began after the calibration sequence, with participants pressing the space bar to instigate the start 
of the trial. During a trial, participants saw a white fixation screen. A black fixation cross was 
centrally located on the fixation screen (1 cm x 1 cm, or 0.95° of visual angle) identified as the 
AOI for this screen. Gaze-contingent trial control was implemented using the AOI such that 
participants could control inter-trial pacing by looking offscreen, and had to trigger the start of a 
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subsequent trial by maintaining gaze toward the AOI for 400 ms. This method allowed us to 
control for attention capture at the start of each trial. 
 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of an angry trial during the dot-probe paradigm with the dot probe 
appearing in the same location which previously held the angry face. Total trial time was > 1200 ms. 
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Figure 2. Graphical representation of an angry trial during the dot-probe paradigm with the dot probe 
appearing in the same location which previously held the neutral face. Total trial time was > 1200 ms. 
Following the 400 ms fixation which triggered the trial, the stimulus screen was shown 
for 200 ms. Onscreen were two additional AOIs, arranged horizontally along either side of the 
central fixation cross. The stimulus AOIs each contained a neutral and emotional image, 
respectively (each 5 cm x 10 cm, or 9.53° of visual angle). We used the NimStim images without 
standardized luminance as they were derived from a set taken under consistent and strictly 
controlled viewing conditions. Offset of the stimulus screen was followed by the fixation screen 
(i.e., image offset) presented for an additional 200 ms. The probe screen was then presented, 
featuring the onset of the target stimulus for the RT cognitive bias measure. The probe consisted 
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of a pair of dim, grey dots (0.25 cm diameter, arranged .25 cm apart, or 0.24° of visual angle) 
which appeared to either the left or right of the central fixation cross. Therefore, the probe was 
presented in the same AOI as either the neutral or emotional stimulus which was previously 
offset.  
The location of presentation (i.e., either replacing the emotional or neutral stimulus) was 
counterbalanced across trials. Using the keyboard, participants indicated as quickly and 
accurately as possible whether the probe appeared to the left or the right of the central fixation 
cross. RT for probes in locations which previously had an emotional face in the same AOI were 
compared against RT for probes in locations which previously had a neutral face in the same 
AOI. This gave our first measure of cognitive biases for the different emotional faces, consistent 
with traditional procedures for the dot-probe paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). The 
RT bias scores were derived from the difference between these two trial types, on average and 
across the emotion types, meaning reactions to neutral and emotional faces were always being 
compared. Positive and larger RT bias scores therefore reflected the tendency across trials to 
respond in a biased manner, i.e., making responses more quickly to probes appearing in a 
location previously containing emotional information.  
For the duration of the dot-probe paradigm session, we also collected eye movement data. 
We used the frequency and duration of eye movements allotted to each stimulus AOI, in addition 
to the same location for the AOIs until offset of the probe, to derive our second measure of 
cognitive bias. More frequent and longer eye movements to locations containing or previously 
containing emotional and neutral information therefore indicated the tendency to respond in a 
biased manner, i.e., spending more time looking at an emotional face and therefore responding 
faster to target information later presented in the same location. 
3.4.3 Data Analyses 
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The present work investigated patterns of cognitive biases for emotional faces in 
neurotypicals, and examined the link between cognitive biases and the level of self-reported 
ASD traits. We considered the relationship between ASD traits and cognitive biases, in terms of 
how our measures relate to AQ scores. We then aimed to examine patterns of cognitive biases 
from our two indices, RT and eye movement data respectively, to determine if the indices were 
measuring the same underlying construct. 
Under short stimulus presentation times, neurotypicals have been shown to reflect cognitive 
biases toward threatening information (Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & van Damme, 2005). 
Given we used short presentation times and emotional faces, we predicted higher AQ scores to 
correlate with atypical cognitive biases, such that cognitive biases would be away from 
emotional faces, and/or toward neutral faces. Lower AQ scores were similarly expected to 
correlate with typical cognitive biases, such that there would be bias toward emotional faces, 
and/or away from neutral faces. Respectively, we conducted Spearman correlations between AQ 
scores and cognitive bias scores obtained from the dot-probe paradigm and eye tracking 
procedures. Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality tests were used to examine the distributions of 
scores and determine whether parametric or non-parametric tests were appropriate. We used an α 
value of .05 for p-values and corrected our bivariate correlations for multiple comparisons where 
appropriate using the Benjamini-Hochberg correction procedure. Corrected p-values equal to or 
less than .05 survived the procedure, Q = .050. Adjusted p-values for bivariate correlations which 
survived the correction procedure are reported respectively in the following sections. 
Raw RT and eye movement data were exported from the E-Prime and Tobii software 
packages in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets (version 16.0). Raw data were preprocessed and 
analyzed using MATLAB (version 42.0), Python (Spyder version 3.3.0), and SPSS software 
(version 21.0). Given the 200 ms imbedded breakpoint between stimulus offset and probe onset 
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(see preprobe in Figures 1 and 2), RTs which were less than 200 ms were already excluded from 
capture in the data collection. RTs greater than 1000 ms were later excluded as they represented 
responses slower than 600 ms beyond probe offset. Responses outside of this window would 
likely reflect inattention during the trial and potentially the failure to detect the target, and their 
exclusion is consistent with traditional procedures (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). From the 
raw RTs, data were retained from an average of 77.81 (S.D. = 8.75) trials per participant. Next, 
we derived our RT indices of cognitive biases from the dot-probe paradigm, per the traditional 
derived scores associated with the paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). RT Bias scores 
were calculated from the difference in RT between trials in which the neutral face and the dot 
probe appeared in the same location, and trials in which the emotional face and the dot probe 
appeared in the same location. These scores therefore reflected the average level and direction of 
cognitive bias in RT across trial types, which were parsed by emotion. Participants therefore 
each had five RT bias scores, one each for angry, calm, fearful, happy, and sad trials.  
Eye movement data had been exported into prespecified eye movement parameters, defining 
gaze on a continuous basis within and without the bounds of the AOIs. Due to the relatively short 
SOA and stimulus presentation times (see (Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & van Damme, 2005) 
we assessed the following commonly used indices for eye tracking cognitive bias studies 
(Fashler & Katz, 2014). We derived the number of trials in which the initial eye movement made 
on the stimulus screen was directed to one of the AOIs (i.e., first gaze following image onset to 
the neutral or emotional face), the proportion of eye movements made to the AOIs out of the 
total number of eye movements made during the full presentation period, and the proportion of 
time spent fixating to the AOIs out of the total duration of fixations for the full presentation 
period. Eye tracking measures were parsed for each emotion type, therefore measures of 
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cognitive biases were derived from the difference in eye movement responses between emotional 
and neutral AOIs.  
We derived total and subscale scores from the AQ which gave a continuous distribution of 
the presence and severity of ASD traits in our neurotypical sample. Pearson’s and Spearman’s 
correlations were conducted to determine whether associations could be found between our 
between-subjects factors, parsed by emotion. We used a within-subjects repeated measures 
design, with emotion and its five levels inputted as the within-subjects factor and cognitive 
biases and ASD traits with their total three levels inputted as between-subjects factors. An α 
value of .05 was used for the statistical tests. Planned comparisons included parametric and non-
parametric comparisons of RT and eye movement-based cognitive biases with the measured 
ASD traits. Exploratory analyses were also conducted to further examine how our two measures 
of cognitive biases could be linked, with the aim of comparing trials in which eye movements 
were made to trials in which no eye movements were recorded to the AOIs. 
3.4.4 Hypotheses 
In samples from the general population, people tend to show cognitive biases toward 
emotional faces. When an emotional face is presented in direct visual competition with a neutral 
face, the emotional face is preferentially processed, either more or less, compared to the neutral 
face. This has been interpreted as cognitive biases in neurotypicals, and has been relatively well-
documented as previously discussed. For samples from populations with major clinical and/or 
psycho-affective disorders, there is mixed evidence for whether individuals show cognitive 
biases for emotional faces (i.e., bias toward neutral or bias away from the emotion; (Bar-Haim, 
Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranengurg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). Congruent with the findings 
which do establish cognitive biases toward emotional compared to neutral faces in neurotypicals, 
we expected our participants to show the same broad pattern of results. In particular, we 
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expected the emotional faces to garner more attentional capture compared to the less salient 
neutral faces, given that we used a neurotypical sample. Within this broad pattern, however, we 
expected to find associations between cognitive biases away from emotional faces and higher 
levels of ASD traits. In short, we expected neurotypicals with higher levels of ASD traits to 
perform more similarly to autistic individuals compared to other neurotypicals with lower levels 
of ASD traits.  
Cogent descriptions of ASD symptoms support the relationship between the social 
communication difficulties often observed in ASD and atypical sensory and emotional 
perception (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). We therefore expected our neurotypical 
participants to show cognitive biases for emotional faces in general, but that higher levels of 
ASD traits would correlate with cognitive biases for neutral, rather than emotional faces. The 
expected association between AQ scores and cognitive bias scores was predicated on the 
expectation that our cognitive bias measures were accessing the same underlying construct. Our 
a priori assumption of this association was tested by comparing cognitive bias scores between 
the measurements, and how they were associated with ASD trait levels. Specifically, participants 
with more cognitive biases for emotional faces would have lower AQ scores, respond faster to 
dot probes which replaced emotional compared to neutral faces, and look more toward emotional 
faces. Participants with cognitive biases away from emotional faces, or toward neutral faces 
would have higher AQ scores, respond faster to dot probes which replaced neutral compared to 
emotional faces, and look less toward emotional faces. Support for these hypotheses in the 
current study might suggest that ASD traits are associated with cognitive biases when viewing 
emotional faces in neurotypicals. 
Chapter 4 
4 Results 
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The present work investigated patterns of cognitive biases for emotional faces in 
neurotypicals, and examined the link between cognitive biases and the level of self-reported 
ASD traits. We predicted higher AQ scores would correlate with atypical cognitive biases (i.e., 
cognitive biases away from emotional faces, or toward neutral faces). In other words, our 
neurotypical sample would show in general cognitive biases for emotional faces to replicate 
standard dot-probe paradigm findings with neurotypicals, however those with higher ASD traits 
would show cognitive biases toward negative, or away from emotional faces.  
4.1 ASD Traits and Cognitive Biases 
4.1.1 AQ Scores 
We first examined the level of ASD traits based on AQ scores obtained from our sample. We 
calculated total AQ scores alongside subscale scores for each participant. Responses to the 50 
items were summed, and then averaged across participants to reveal a mean total AQ score of 
62.83 (S.D. = 11.13, N = 101). Total scores ranged from 38 to 96, within the possible range of 0 
to 150 (Stevenson & Hart, 2017). See Figure 3 for the distribution of total AQ scores. Subscale 
scores were summed from their respective 10 items, then averaged across participants to reveal 
mean AQ subscale scores of 10.41 (S.D. = 4.40) for social skills, 16.11 (S.D. = 3.86) for 
attention switching, 15.84 (S.D. = 3.73) for attention to detail, 6.29 (S.D. = 3.11) for 
communication, and 10.34 (S.D. = 3.73) for imagination. See Figure 4 for the distribution of 
mean AQ subscale scores. We conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality, which 
revealed the total AQ score (D(101) = 0.06, p = .891), and the five subscales followed an 
approximately normal distribution (D(101) = 0.09, p = .387 for social skills, D(101) = 0.10, p = 
.228 for attention switching, D(101) = 0.10, p = .210 for attention to detail, D(101) = 0.09, p = 
.312 for communication, and D(101) = 0.10, p = .227 for imagination. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of AQ total scores for all participants who completed the AQ, N = 101. Scored of a 
possible range of 0 to 150. Mean score 62.83 (S.D. = 11.13). 
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Figure 4. Comparison of mean AQ subscale scores for all participants who completed the AQ, N = 101. 
Possible range of scores 0 to 30. ‘X’ notation on the figure represents mean and error bars represent standard 
deviation (S.D.). Mean scores 10.41 (S.D. = 4.40) for social skills, 16.11 (S.D. = 3.86) for attention switching, 
15.84 (S.D. = 3.73) for attention to detail, 6.29 (S.D. = 3.11) for communication, and 10.34 (S.D. = 3.73) for 
imagination. 
4.1.2 Dot-Probe Paradigm Indices 
The next step was to derive RT-based measures of cognitive biases from the dot-probe 
paradigm, per procedures described in association with the traditional task (MacLeod et al., 
1986). Raw RTs were first extracted for trials in which the dot probe was correctly identified 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
(i.e., accurate trials) between 200 ms and 1200 ms after its onset. On average, participants 
correctly identified the location of the probe during 77.81% (S.D. = 8.75) of the total 240 trials, 
above the generally accepted 75% cutoff for RT accuracy (e.g., Morales, Taber-Thomas, & 
Perez-Edgar, 2017). From these accurate trials, we calculated RT bias scores as the difference in 
RT between trials in which the dot probe appeared in the same location as the emotional face, 
compared to the location of the neutral face. RT bias scores were averaged across participants to 
reveal, by emotional category, mean scores of RT Bias Angry = 11.11(S.D. = 71.36, N = 107), 
RT Bias Calm = -16.41 (S.D. = 85.92), RT Bias Fear = 6.25, (S.D. = 72.09), RT Bias Happy = 
0.35 (S.D. = 70.37), and RT Bias Sad = 11.03 (S.D. = 66.14). See Figure 5 for a graphical 
representation of RT Bias scores by emotion. We conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of 
normality, which revealed the RT Bias Angry score (D(101) = 0.12, p = .075), and the RT Bias 
Sad score (D(101) = 0.10, p = .204) did follow an approximately normal distribution, whereas 
the RT Bias Calm score (D(101) = 0.14, p = .020), the RT Bias Fear score (D(101) = 0.14, p = 
.032), the RT Bias Happy score (D(101) = 0.16, p = .009) did not follow a normal distribution.  
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Figure 5. Distribution of mean RT Bias scores for all participants who completed the dot-probe paradigm, 
N = 107. ‘X’ notation on the figure represents mean and error bars represent standard deviation (S.D.). 
Mean scores RT Bias Angry = 11.11, S.D. = 71.36; RT Bias Calm = -16.41, S.D. = 85.92; RT Bias Fear = 
6.25, S.D. = 72.09; RT Bias Happy = 0.35, S.D. = 70.37; RT Bias Sad = 11.03, S.D. = 66.14. 
4.1.3 Eye Tracking Indices 
We also recorded the frequency and duration of eye movements, according to previously 
used eye tracking parameters in conjunction with the dot-probe paradigm (Fashler & Katz, 
2014). The number of initial eye movements and the duration of time with gaze directed to the 
emotional and neutral faces were compared as eye tracking indices of cognitive biases. We also 
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examined the proportion of trials with eye movements made, of the total 240 trials. On average, 
participants made their initial eye movement to angry faces during 1.38 (S.D. = 1.88) trials, 1.26 
(S.D. = 1.85) trials for calm faces, 1.28 (S.D. = 2.17) trials for fearful faces, 1.49 (S.D. = 2.11) 
trials for happy faces, and 1.26 (S.D. = 1.67) trials for sad faces through the full dot-probe 
paradigm session. On average, participants held gaze to angry faces for 806.56 ms (S.D. = 
1079.43), 681.01 ms (S.D. = 1050.37) for calm faces, 805.12 ms (S.D. = 1124.65) for fearful 
faces, 1031.06 ms (S.D. = 4544.15) for happy faces, 915.62 ms (S.D. = 2304.80) for sad faces 
through the full dot-probe paradigm session. Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality tests 
revealed initial eye movements to angry faces were not normally distributed, D(107) = .30, p < 
.0001, to calm faces, D(107) = .25, p < .0001, to fearful faces, D(107) = .27, p < .0001, to happy 
faces, D(107) = .26, p < .0001, and to sad faces, D(107) = .27, p < .0001. The tests revealed also 
that the duration of gaze held to angry faces, D(107) = .22, p < .0001, to calm faces, D(107) = 
.26, p < .0001, to fearful faces, D(107) = .23, p < .0001, to happy faces, D(107) = .38, p < .0001, 
and to happy faces, D(107) = .34, p < .0001 were also not normally distributed. Across 
participants, eye movements were made to the left and right side of the screen during only 
15.23% of trials (S.D. = 18.35), therefore each eye tracking measure was populated only by a 
small number of trials and eye movements. See Figure 6 for a graphical representation of the 
number of trials in which eye movements were made across participants. 
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Figure 6. Frequency distribution of trials in which eye movements were made for all participants, N = 
107. Proportion of eye movements of the total 240 trials; on average, eye movements were made during 
15.23% of trials (S.D. = 18.35). 
4.2 Correlating ASD Traits and Cognitive Biases 
We used non-parametric Spearman correlations to assess the relationship between ASD traits 
and dot-probe paradigm indices of cognitive biases. Although some of the variables of interest 
did follow an approximately normal distribution, a number of the cognitive bias indices did not 
follow a normal distribution, and we opted to conduct the same type of correlations. See 
Numbers 1 to 11 in Table 1 for the full matrix of Spearman rank correlations between AQ total 
and subscale scores and RT Bias scores. RT bias scores for angry, calm, fearful, happy, and sad 
faces were not associated with total AQ scores nor subscale scores (range of Spearman’s ρs = -
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.163 to .131, ps = .101 to .925, N = 101). To summarize, we found no evidence of an association 
between AQ scores and RT bias scores for different emotional faces. We thus fail to support an 
association between ASD traits and dot-probe indices of cognitive biases in the current study. 
Spearman correlations were also used to assess the relationship between ASD traits and eye 
movement indices of cognitive biases. See Table 2 for the matrix of Spearman rank correlations 
between AQ total and subscale scores and eye movement biases. Eye movement data revealed 
that there was an association between the initial eye movements made toward angry faces and 
scores from the attention to detail subscale, Spearman’s ρ = -.201 p = .048. There was an 
association between the duration of time with gaze directed toward sad faces and scores from the 
attention to detail subscale, Spearman’s ρ = -.103 p = .020. Finally, there was an association 
between the duration of time with gaze directed toward happy faces and scores from the attention 
switching subscale, Spearman’s ρ = .207, p = .042. However, the majority of the eye movement 
indices for angry, sad, and happy faces and all of the indices for calm and fearful faces were not 
correlated with total or subscale AQ scores, Spearman’s ρs < .01 to .99, ps = .100 to .999. 
Further, after correcting for multiple comparisons, the associations failed to survive the 
correction procedure (adjusted ps = .160 to .192). To summarize, we found no evidence of an 
association between AQ scores and eye movement cognitive bias measurements for different 
emotional faces. We thus fail to support an association between ASD traits and eye tracking 
indices of cognitive biases in the current study. Taken together, the results from the dot-probe 
paradigm and eye tracking indices of cognitive biases indicate no evidence to support a 
relationship between ASD traits and cognitive biases. 
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Table 1: Spearman’s Rho (ρ) Rank Order Correlation Matrix Between ASD Traits and Dot-Probe 
Indices of Cognitive Biases (N = 101).  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Total AQ -- .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .654 .506 .436 .774 .925 .147 .433 .182 .370 .740 
 2. Social Skills .774** -- .000** .284 .000** .194 .387 .592 .310 .652 .234 .069 .703 .042* .593 .720 
 3. Attn 
Switching 
.630** .423** -- .191 .000** .692 .730 .858 .250 .667 .650 .364 .087 .374 .839 .265 
 4. Attn to Detail .387** .107 .130 -- .840 .419 .101 .136 .329 .770 .830 .504 .293 .704 .250 .366 
 5. 
Communication 
.692** .720** .362** -.020 -- .040* .179 .760 .188 .496 .908 .243 .625 .005** .371 .540 
 6. Imagination .397** .129 .040 -.080* .203* -- .439 .640 .350 .524 .617 .250 .416 .251 .053 .059 
7. RT Angry .045 .086 .018 -.163 .133 .077 -- .622 .032 .732 .561 .000** .266 .005** .961 .082 
8. RT Calm -.066 .053 -.114 -.148 .030 -.047 -.049 -- .744 .135 .273 .438 .000** .796 .274 .794 
9. RT Fear .078 .101 .043 .097 .131 -.093 .212 -.033 -- .499 .015* .326 .768 .000** .488 .007* 
10. RT Happy .029 -.045 -.045 -.029 .068 .063 .034 .148 .067 -- .115 .980 .051 .542 .000** .181 
11. RT Sad .009 -.118 .009 -.021 -.012 -.050 .058 -.109 .239** .156 -- .574 .134 .112 .501 .000** 
12. RTn Angry .144 .137 .068 -.067 .116 .114 .886** -.077 .098 .002 .056 -- .184 .125 .881 .316 
13. RTn Calm -.078 .038 -.169 -.105 .049 -.081 -.111 .892** -.029 .192 -.149* -.132 -- .904 .315 .883 
14. RTn Fear .132 .201* .088 .038 .277** -.114 .273** .026 .771** .061 .158* .152 .012 -- .962 .019 
15. RTn Happy .089 -.053 .020 -.114 .089 .192 .005 .109 -.069 .711** .067 .015 .100 .005 -- .685 
16. RTn Sad -.033 -.036 .111 -.090 .061 -.186 .172 .026 .266* .133 .799** .100 .015 .230** .040 -- 
M 62.95 10.44 16.14 15.92 6.28 10.30 11.11 16.41 6.25 0.35 11.03 17.24 0.59 3.98 12.96 5.55 
S.D. 11.05 4.38 3.85 3.80 3.10 3.38 71.36 85.92 72.09 70.37 66.14 51.78 57.91 51.81 53.34 46.85 
Note. Associations between total AQ and subscale AQ scores, reaction time (RT) biases for trials with angry, 
calm, fearful, happy, and sad faces presented, and RT biases for trials in which no eye movements were made 
(RTn) with angry, calm, fearful, happy, and sad faces presented. Left and lower portion of the matrix shows ρ, 
Spearman’s coefficient; right and upper portion of the matrix shows p, the unadjusted probability value. * 
represents p < .05, ** represents p <.001. M = mean, SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 2: Spearman’s Rho (ρ) Rank Order Correlation Matrix Between ASD Traits and Eye 
Tracking Indices of Cognitive Biases (N = 101). 
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Total AQ .453 .873 .948 .939 .759 .903 .745 .682 .375 .110 .481 
 2. Social Skills .384 .400 .875 .600 .890 .402 .769 .665 .878 .562 .723 
 3. Attn Switching .068 .295 .850 .273 .311 .320 .224 .954 .165 .042* .412 
 4. Attn to Detail .358 .048* .856 .832 .999 .313 .367 .551 .831 .424 .020* 
 5. Communication .729 .802 .694 .453 .539 .360 .419 .795 .453 .524 .552 
 6. Imagination .343 .796 .121 .719 .689 .948 .704 .598 .864 .321 .878 
7. Proportion EM Trials -- .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** 
8. First EM Angry -- -- -- .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** 
9. First EM Calm -- -- -- .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** 
10. First EM Fear -- -- -- -- .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** 
11. First EM Happy -- -- -- -- -- .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** 
12. First EM Sad -- -- -- -- -- -- .000** .000** .000** .000** .000** 
13. EM (ms) Angry -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .000** .000** .000** .000** 
14. EM (ms) Calm -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .000** .000** .000** 
15. EM (ms) Fear -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .000** .000** 
16. EM (ms) Happy -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .000** 
17. EM (ms) Sad -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
     
M 15.23 1.38 1.25 1.27 1.49 1.26 806.57 681.01 805.12 1301.15 915.62 
S.D. 18.35 1.88 1.85 2.17 2.11 1.67 1079.43 1050.37 1124.65 4544.15 2304.80 
Note. Associations between total AQ and subscale AQ scores and eye movement (EM) indices of cognitive 
biases. EM indices included the proportion of trials in which EMs occurred, the number of first EMs made, 
and duration of EMs (in ms) made to the angry, calm, fearful, happy, and sad faces. Left and lower portion of 
the matrix shows ρ, Spearman’s coefficient, unreported values ρs = .313** to .850**; right and upper portion 
of the matrix shows p, the unadjusted probability value. * represents p < .05, ** represents p <.001. M = mean, 
S.D. = standard deviation. 
4.3 Cognitive Biases: Task Performance 
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Our next goal was to look further into how participants performed the dot-probe paradigm. 
We were interested in the impact of the emotion presented on the patterns of cognitive biases 
measured. We also examined the presence and patterns of the eye movements we tracked during 
the dot-probe paradigm. 
4.3.1 Effect of Emotion 
To detect differences in RT as a function of the emotion presented, we conducted a non-
parametric Friedman’s test for a repeated measures analysis of variance using ranks. We found 
no evidence for differences in RT bias scores as a function of emotion, X2(3) = 2.12, p = .548. 
The type of emotion presented did not significantly account for individual heterogeneity in our 
dot-probe indices of cognitive biases. Because some of the data did not follow a normal 
distribution, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted. Results from the Wilcoxon test 
indicated the median score of RT Bias Angry and RT Bias Sad scores were significantly higher 
than a median score of 0, with Mdn = 10.96, Z = 3758.00, p < .012 and Mdn = 10.04, Z = 
3603.50, p < .043 but were not different from one another. The median score of RT Bias Calm, 
RT Bias Fear, and RT Bias Happy were not higher than a median score of 0, with Mdn = -5.07, Z 
= 2532.50, p = .208, Mdn = 4.52, Z = 3371.50, p = .189, and Mdn = -0.22, Z = 3139.00, p = .548 
respectively. In general, our RT Bias scores did not significantly differ from a hypothesized 
median of 0.  
4.3.2 Effect of Eye Movements 
We previously reported participants made eye movements during only 15% of the dot-probe 
paradigm trials. Overall, several participants made no eye movements to either the left or right 
side of the screen during the entire dot-probe paradigm session. Thirty-five more participants 
made no eye movements to either locations during 95% or more of the total 240 trials, and an 
additional sixty participants made eye movements to either location during 50% or fewer of the 
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trials. Eight participants did make eye movements more than 50% of the time. The low number 
of eye movements and the high RT accuracy together show that accurate performance on the dot-
probe paradigm was not significantly impacted by participants failing to make an eye movement 
to either side of the screen. Given our sample performed above the 75% accuracy cutoff yet 
made so few eye movements, eye movements toward the probe may not have been required for 
probe detection with acceptable accuracy. Together, our second main result was that we found no 
differences in cognitive biases as a function of the emotion presented, and few eye movements 
were made during the dot-probe paradigm in general despite accurate performance. 
4.4 Cognitive Biases: Concurrent Measures 
After examination of the previous dot-probe paradigm and eye tracking measures of 
cognitive biases and their association with ASD traits from the AQ, we also wanted to determine 
how the two measurements might be consolidated. Participants made eye movements to the left 
and right side of the screen during only 15% of the total number of trials, meaning that a 
majority of the data which populates our RT bias scores comes from trials in which no eye 
movements were made. Therefore, we explored how our eye tracking procedures might be used 
to better understand how participants performed during the dot-probe paradigm. We may not 
make direct conclusions about the eye movements measured per se, considering the low number 
overall made during the dot-probe paradigm. However, we can explore trials in which 
participants were not looking at the stimuli. The exploratory cognitive bias measure is thus 
informed by our use of eye tracking, but we isolate cognitive biases to represent only covert 
biases in the absence of overt visual attention (i.e., allocated gaze) toward the stimuli. 
Given the relatively low number of eye movements made across all participants and trials, 
and the spurious relationships between our derived cognitive bias scores and ASD traits, we 
explored the association between our cognitive bias measures to determine whether they were 
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assessing the same underlying construct. Eye movements have been shown to impact RT-based 
measurements of cognitive biases, where gaze occurring prior to probe onset can diminish or 
obscure the measured RT effect (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Petrova, Wentura, & 
Bermeitinger, 2013). Given the distribution of trials in which eye movements were made 
compared to those in which no eye movements were made, we sought to exclude trials with eye 
movements from the exploratory analyses. Although participants who failed to make eye 
movements during a majority of trials did not perform the dot-probe paradigm as expected, this 
may help to explain why RTs were not impacted by emotion but the average performance of our 
sample in terms of RT-based accuracy was above the accepted 75% cutoff. 
We analyzed the exploratory RTn Bias Scores for trials in which no eye movements were 
made, using the same procedures as the RT Bias scores for all trials regardless of eye 
movements. By emotion type and averaged across participants, our data revealed an average of 
RTn Bias Angry = 17.24 (S.D. = 51.78), RTn Bias Calm = 0.59 (S.D. = 57.91), RTn Bias Fear = 
3.98 (S.D. = 51.81), RTn Bias Happy = 12.96 (S.D. = 53.34), and RTn Bias Sad = 5.55 (S.D. = 
46.85). We conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality, which revealed the RTn Bias 
Calm score (D(101) = 0.09, p = .311), the RTn Bias Fear score (D(101) = 0.12, p = .050), and the 
RTn Bias Sad score (D(101) = 0.07, p = .542) did follow an approximately normal distribution, 
whereas the RTn Bias Angry score (D(101) = 0.13, p = .035) and the RTn Bias Happy score 
(D(101) = 0.13, p = .035) did not follow a normal distribution.  
To mirror aspects of the previous analyses, we also used Spearman correlations to examine 
the association between ASD traits and dot-probe indices of cognitive biases when participants 
made no eye movements during the trials (see Figure 7). See Numbers 1 to 6 and 12 to 16 in 
Table 1 for the matrix of Spearman rank correlations between AQ total and subscale scores and 
RTn Bias scores for trials without eye movements. RTn bias scores for angry, calm, happy, and 
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sad faces were not associated with total AQ scores nor subscale scores (range of Spearman’s ρs 
= -.186 to .192, ps = .053 to .839). RTn bias scores for fearful faces, however, were associated 
with scores from the social skills (Spearman’s ρ = .201, p = .042) and the communication 
subscales (Spearman’s ρ = .277, p = .005). After correcting for multiple comparisons, only the 
correlation between RTn bias scores for fearful faces and scores from the communication 
subscale survived the procedure, adjusted p = .03. Given the outsized contribution to our overall 
dot-probe paradigm data from trials in which no eye movements were made, the exploratory 
results unsurprisingly mirror the same spurious trends as the overall RT Bias scores. Taken 
together, the findings show no evidence overall for the association between ASD traits and 
cognitive biases for different emotional faces. 
 
Figure 7. Scatterplot showing the spurious association between AQ Communication Subscale Scores RTn 
Bias Fear scores. After correction for multiple comparisons, adjusted p = .03 (N = 101). 
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Chapter 5 
5 Discussion 
The current study investigated whether ASD traits and cognitive biases for emotional faces 
were linked in neurotypicals. We used the dot-probe paradigm with concurrent eye tracking to 
relate self-reported ASD trait levels with two measures of cognitive biases, and to assess whether 
the two measures were assessing the same underlying construct. First, we found no evidence to 
support a relationship between ASD traits and cognitive biases both in terms of dot-probe and 
eye tracking indices. Second, our results showed there were no differences in cognitive biases as 
a function of the emotion presented, and that very few eye movements were made during the dot-
probe paradigm across the majority of participants. Third, when we excluded dot-probe paradigm 
trials with eye movements, we again found no evidence to support a relationship between ASD 
traits and RT indices of cognitive biases. We outline and contextualize our findings within the 
extant literature, and discuss the potential contribution of our design to further investigations of 
ASD traits and cognitive biases. 
5.1 The Relationship Between ASD Traits and Cognitive Biases 
One of the primary goals of the study was to address the relationship between ASD traits and 
cognitive biases for emotional faces. Our first overarching result was that we found no evidence 
to support a relationship between ASD traits and cognitive biases using either of our cognitive 
bias measures. As a first step to address our goal, we assessed the level of self-reported ASD 
traits with the expectation that our neurotypical sample would score a roughly normal 
distribution of traits on the AQ (Ruzich, 2015). Total AQ scores did follow an approximately 
normal, continuous distribution, supporting that our sample was likely representative of the 
general population in terms of ASD traits. The second step to address the goal was to relate the 
level of ASD traits with our two measures of cognitive biases. There is currently mixed evidence 
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from both dot-probe and eye tracking indices of cognitive biases as to how they are impacted as 
a function of ASD. However, a large body of evidence does establish that emotional stimuli are 
more salient, more accurately processed, and more quickly attended to compared to neutral 
stimuli in paradigms such as the visual search and dot-probe paradigms (MacLeod, Mathews, & 
Tata, 1986). Taken together, this evidence lends itself to our a priori expectation that higher 
ASD trait levels would correspond to atypical cognitive biases, such that participants with higher 
ASD traits would show cognitive biases away from emotional faces, or toward neutral faces as 
the emotional faces would be interpreted as more threatening. Contrary to our expectations, in 
the present study, no relationship was found between the level of ASD traits and cognitive bias 
measures from the dot-probe or eye tracking indices. We further dissect the current 
understanding of cognitive biases by isolating evidence from each of our two measures.  
5.1.1 The Dot-Probe Paradigm 
Given no relationship could be found between ASD traits and RT scores obtained from the 
dot-probe paradigm, our results somewhat support previous evidence in which no differences in 
cognitive biases could be measured as a function of ASD traits (Greene, Suess, & Kelly, 2020; 
Hollocks, Ozivadjian, Mathews, Howlin, & Simonoff, 2013; Monk, et al., 2010). This would 
seem to support the idea that the mechanisms which dictate the automatic aspects of face 
processing can be unimpacted even in association with ASD characteristics. It is possible we 
failed to find a relationship between ASD traits and cognitive biases due to relatively short 
stimulus presentation times (200 ms), however other studies using neurotypicals have shown 
threat biases may be measured even at 100 ms presentation rates (Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, 
& van Damme, 2005). One study reported there were no cognitive biases for emotional faces in 
ASD, but they were uninterrupted in neurotypicals (Moore, Heavey, & Reidy, 2012). Our 
findings therefore go against what we would expect based on dot-probe paradigm evidence in 
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which there are face processing differences between neurotypical and clinical ASD groups, 
however, they do fit with several studies which found no differences in cognitive biases related 
to ASD traits.  
5.1.2 Eye Tracking 
With respect to previous eye tracking studies of cognitive biases, the current results align 
with recent findings in which no differences were observed as a function of ASD traits (Greene, 
Suess, & Kelly, 2020). However, our finding goes against what we might expect based on the 
known difficulty processing faces associated with clinical ASD (Swanson, Serlin, & Siller, 2013; 
Swanson & Siller, 2014), and the extension of ASD traits within the general population. The 
finding of no relationship between ASD traits and cognitive biases in the current study is thus 
supported by some of the existing evidence, however, goes against our expectation that we 
would see the face processing difficulties often reported in ASD extend to those with ASD traits. 
The low number of eye movements made in addition to the neurotypical sample may together 
help to explain one reason why we failed to find a relationship between ASD traits and cognitive 
biases. Eye tracking paradigms have previously been used to show some of the complex features 
of ASD (Falck-Ytter, Bölte, & Gredebäck, 2013), and that ASD has been associated with 
cognitive biases in more automatic aspects of attention for social scenes (Santos, et al., 2011). In 
line with our expectations of cognitive biases for emotional compared to neutral faces in the RT 
portion of the dot-probe paradigm, we expected similar patterns with our eye tracking measures. 
Specifically, we predicted participants would look longer and more frequently at emotional 
compared to neutral faces, but that for those with high ASD traits, they would show neutral and 
not emotional biases in general and look more at the negative and not positive faces. In light of 
the profound social and face processing difficulties often reported by autistic individuals, there 
may be differences in cognitive biases and face processing which the current methodology fails 
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to detect, however further research is required to determine whether cognitive biases are 
impacted in individuals with ASD traits.  
5.2 Cognitive Biases: Task Performance 
Another goal we addressed was to shed light on the patterns of cognitive biases while 
participants performed the dot-probe paradigm. Our second overarching result was that we found 
no differences in cognitive biases as a function of the emotion presented, and few eye 
movements were made during the dot-probe paradigm in general. Consistent with the hypothesis 
that the emotional factors of a stimulus play a role in active gaze (Niu, Todd, & Anderson, 
2012), and the standard result of the dot-probe paradigm reflects bias toward threat-relevant 
locations (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), we expected to find cognitive biases for 
emotional compared to neutral faces. Our data did not reflect a relationship between ASD traits 
and cognitive biases. The specific emotion presented was not related to differences in the level of 
cognitive bias shown, in terms of RT or eye movement indices. These findings do not align with 
previous evidence supporting that adults tend to bias away from negative faces in favor of 
positive faces (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000). Our results do however align with previous 
findings in no difference in processing of neutral and emotional faces were found, where 
children showed no cognitive biases for angry, sad, or happy faces (Garcia-Blanco, et al., 2017), 
nor for faces displaying disgust (Zhao, Zhang, Fu, & Maes, 2016). Therefore, it seems cognitive 
biases for different emotional faces are not fully understood in terms of how they present across 
the lifespan, nor in the role different emotions play in the direction and magnitude of cognitive 
biases. Our findings contribute to the currently mixed evidence surrounding ASD traits and 
cognitive biases. 
Interestingly, when we examined the number of eye movements actually made during the 
trials, participants made eye movements on average during only 15% of all trials. This means 
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that the RT measure of cognitive biases was populated primarily by trials in which no overt 
attention was directed toward either the emotional or neutral face or the dot probe. Despite the 
overall dearth of eye movements from our sample during the dot-probe paradigm, we wanted to 
use the concurrent eye tracking and dot-probe paradigms methodologies to better understand 
how participants were performing the task. Considering the usable eye tracking data was 
therefore lacking, it is difficult to conclude whether there was covert attention paid to the stimuli 
in the absence of eye movements (Anderson & Yantis, 2012), and whether this would have 
impacted subsequent reactions to the dot probes. It is possible that the emotional faces were not 
salient enough compared to the neutral faces, however we selected faces which had received at 
least 85% ratings in terms of recognizability and intensity of the emotion from previously 
validated raters (Tottenham, et al., 2009). Another reason for the relatively small number of eye 
movements made during the dot-probe paradigm may have been due to the gaze contingent trial 
control we used to structure and control for attention at the start of the trial. With eye gaze 
required to be maintained to the central fixation cross for 400 ms at the start of each trial, it is 
possible participants resorted to remaining fixated for the duration of the trial on the fixation 
cross. However, participants were only instructed that the maintained eye gaze would trigger the 
start of the trials and that pictures and targets would appear; further, without the gaze 
contingency, the current methodology would not be useful to measure cognitive biases in very 
young or socially and verbally disadvantaged individuals given the relative importance of eye 
movements to faces. Further, the relatively high accuracy retained in terms of detecting the dot 
probes indicate that there was not necessarily a lack of attention to either the left or right side of 
the screen, where the faces and probes appeared. 
Previously, researchers have explicitly instructed participants not to view the stimuli 
(Waechter & Stolz, 2015; Valuch & Kulke, 2020), in order to specifically measure covert 
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attention biases. We replicated this in our exploratory analyses, by excluding trials in which eye 
movements were made. Therefore, the patterns of cognitive biases which we measured 
necessarily fit better with previous studies of covert attention to emotional faces, as opposed to 
the majority of dot-probe paradigm studies which do not control for eye movements. Without the 
use of concurrent eye tracking, participants' accuracy on the dot-probe paradigm would have 
been measured without knowing how participants were actually performing the task, which was 
in general to make no eye movements to the stimulus locations onscreen. Although our results 
are generally trending in the expected manner and we did find several spurious correlations 
between ASD traits and cognitive biases, a majority of the data making up the RT-based measure 
of cognitive biases was therefore coming from trials in which eye movements were not made. 
Researchers have previously identified the impact of eye movements to measured cognitive 
biases, in which eye movements occurring prior to the onset of the dot probe can obscure or 
diminish the RT effect of interest (Petrova, Wentura, & Bermeitinger, 2013). Further, as 
participants did not make many eye movements during a majority of the dot-probe paradigm 
trials, we cannot conclude whether cognitive biases were representative of vigilance for the 
positive emotions, or from difficulty disengaging attention from the location in which emotional 
stimuli previously appeared. Although there were few biases seen across our sample altogether, 
individual differences in cognitive biases gave a continuous distribution with which to run 
correlations with our ASD trait measure (see Figure 5). Further investigations of cognitive biases 
should exert control over the eye movements permitted during face processing tasks. 
Additionally, eye tracking should be used to help examine where participants are looking during 
the dot-probe paradigm. This adaptation to the current methodology would contribute to our 
understanding of cognitive biases and how they are informed by eye movements, which is 
needed to further disentangle the processes which give rise to cognitive biases. A key benefit of 
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using eye tracking procedures is that they are relatively unobtrusive and internally methods 
which can be easily adapted for use across a wide variety of individuals, who have a wide range 
of abilities. This aspect of the current methodology should therefore be retained to the benefit of 
autistic individuals in future studies of cognitive biases.  
5.3 Cognitive Biases: Concurrent Measures 
The final goal of the current study was to investigate the relationship between two concurrent 
but distinct measures of cognitive biases, the dot-probe paradigm with eye tracking. Our third 
overarching result was that comparisons of our measures gave little evidence to support a 
relationship between the dot-probe paradigm and eye tracking indices of cognitive biases, given 
that we could exclude dot-probe paradigm trials in which eye movements occurred. We were 
curious as to whether eye tracking would lend itself to provide a more accurate, appropriate 
measure of cognitive biases which could be later compared to previous findings, making the 
design more suitable for individuals with cognitive, social, and/or verbal difficulties compared to 
the traditional dot-probe paradigm. The current study addressed a first step toward adapting 
widely used procedures for autistic individuals, by examining whether the patterns of cognitive 
biases measured using the dot-probe paradigm and those measured through eye tracking were 
indeed comparable in terms of how they related to ASD traits. When we examined the patterns 
of cognitive bias from our two measures, we found our results did not support the relationship 
between our RT-based and eye movement-based measures of cognitive biases for emotional 
faces. The dot-probe paradigm has been previously combined with concurrent eye tracking, for 
example in individuals with chronic pain (Fashler & Katz, 2014). In their study, participants 
completed the dot-probe paradigm while eye movements were recorded, to reveal while the RT 
indices showed no cognitive biases, the eye movement indices showed cognitive biases toward 
pain-related stimuli. In another study with neurotypicals as participants, anxiety traits were not 
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found to be associated with cognitive biases from the dot-probe paradigm, but were associated 
with cognitive biases measured using eye movements (Veerapa, et al., 2020). Despite the fact we 
did not find a relationship between our two indices of cognitive biases, we suspect this may be in 
large part due to the lack of eye movements made in general. However, when isolating the RT 
measure to only include trials without eye movements, the RT effect again produced only 
spurious relationships with ASD traits. The current methodology may yet be used to better 
inform future investigations of face processing as a function of ASD traits. Namely, how 
performance on the cognitive task may be better understood in light of a concurrent, continuous 
stream of data regarding where participants look in future tasks. 
Although there was an outsized number of trials during which no eye movements were made, 
this was perhaps not an inherent limitation of the current methodology. We used a neurotypical 
sample, and gave no instructions to specifically attend to or look at the emotional or neutral face 
stimuli. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that we had a relatively small range of ASD traits, 
few to no participants with very high trait levels, and few participants who made a large number 
of eye movements to the emotional and neutral faces. In the absence of eye movements, 
however, it becomes exceedingly difficult to draw a meaningful conclusion about overt cognitive 
biases using eye tracking. 
This presents a key methodological impasse for researchers attempting to consolidate 
existing measures of cognitive biases in more accessible and translatable ways for autistic 
individuals, and those of lower ages, and cognitive and verbal abilities. Further research is 
needed to identify whether cognitive biases can be reliably measured in participants in the 
absence of verbal instructions or task demands, in order to make measurements of cognitive 
biases more naturalistic and appropriate for these populations. Because the traditional dot-probe 
paradigm does require a degree of cognitive capacity to respond to instructions and onscreen task 
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demands, it renders the paradigm potentially unsuitable for some individuals on the autism 
spectrum (Burris, Barry-Anwar, & Rivera, 2017). If instructions and task demands are also 
required for eye tracking studies of cognitive biases, and if eye movements may not occur even 
with these controls in place, perhaps these paradigms are also unsuitable for some individuals on 
the spectrum. Artifacts in research methodology are indeed common to some investigations of 
cognitive biases (Haselton, Nettle, & Murray, 2015), and the current study aligns with this 
explanation of our two significant correlations which did survive correction procedures, given 
the overarching lack of supporting or similar evidence our of comparisons. At present, it appears 
that some other way of ensuring eye movements to stimuli is required, in a manner that would 
not be inherently disturbing, threatening, or off-putting to an autistic or non-autistic individual. 
It appears there are further limitations to adapting the current methodology for use with 
individuals with reduced cognitive, social, and/or verbal abilities considering the two measures 
were not related. Perhaps the dot-probe paradigm and eye tracking indices were indeed accessing 
different constructs, namely that the dot-probe paradigm measure derives a bias score based on a 
single response during a trial, whereas eye tracking offers a larger picture of the initial and 
maintained visual attention during an entire trial. The current study is thus limited by the lack of 
eye movements made in our ability to draw conclusions based on overt visual attention, however, 
does inform how RT-based and eye movement indices of cognitive biases might be compared in 
future studies. 
5.4  Conclusions 
It is imperative to better understand the mechanisms underlying cognitive biases and whether 
they are impacted in relation to ASD traits, in light of the increase in studies using the dot-probe 
paradigm with autistic individuals. Offshoots of the traditional methodology now include 
cognitive bias modification techniques, which are implemented to offset or ameliorate biased 
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processing styles (see (Aday & Carlson, 2017). In these therapeutic sessions, using procedures 
similar to that of a dot-probe paradigm session, consistent and repeated exposure to 
circumstances in which the negative or threatening cue is repeatedly reinforced, or associated 
with positive outcomes, cognitive biases may be reduced or made to be more typical over time. 
Given the increasing prevalence of cognitive bias modification techniques, coupled with our 
still-stunted understanding of cognitive biases and how they should be measured across and 
within different vulnerable populations, it becomes increasingly important to identify key issues 
within the current methodology and ways they might be improved in the future. Further still, we 
do not fully understand how social stimuli, especially emotional faces, are processed or may be 
interpreted differently as a function of ASD traits. Although dot-probe paradigm and eye 
tracking methods are commonly used separately in cognitive tasks and they have been more 
recently combined, it appears that this combination in the absence of controlled eye movements 
is not an appropriate measurement of cognitive biases in neurotypicals, nor does it represent 
translatable methodology for individuals with more severe presentations of ASD traits. 
The current work represents an important investigation of cognitive biases along a 
continuous distribution of ASD traits in a sample from the general population. We assessed the 
link between ASD traits and cognitive biases during an RT-based cognitive task with concurrent 
eye tracking. We found spurious relationships which failed to support the relationship between 
ASD traits and cognitive biases, and have provided evidence that cognitive biases should be 
further examined as a potential explanatory factor underlying some of the heterogeneity seen in 
ASD. Further, the manner in which emotional face processing is impacted as a function of ASD 
traits and how we structure tasks with emotional faces as stimuli should be assessed to develop 
appropriate measures of cognitive biases for individuals of wider cognitive, social, and verbal 
abilities. More complex investigation of these variables is warranted especially in light of the 
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fact our sample made very few eye movements to the faces during the dot-probe paradigm in 
general. 
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Appendix A – Letter of Information 
          ________________________________________ 
Sensory Processing in development and in autism Information letter – Adult  
Prof. Ryan Stevenson Department of Psychology Western University 519-661-2111 ext. 81182  
1. Invitation to participate  
You’re invited to participate in a study investigating how sensory processing influences how we 
interact with the world, how that changes as you grow up, and where there are differences in 
individuals with autism. There will be two groups of participants recruited, individuals with and 
without autism spectrum disorder, with 800 individuals recruited in total, ranging in age from 4 to 
65.  
2. Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of the study is to understand how people use the things they hear and see, how 
they put what they hear and see together, and how these processes develop to impact how 
people interact with the world, particularly those with autism. Almost everything people do in the 
world depends on how we perceive the world. Little is known about difference in how each one 
of us as individuals see, hear, and feel the world around us impact our communicative abilities, 
social abilities, and personalities. This study seeks to explore these relationships. This project is 
for research only, there is no clinical therapy element involved.  
3. How long will you be in the study?  
The study will take from 1-4 hours, depending on which portion of the experiment you are 
participating in today. Behavioural, eye tracking, EEG, fMRI, and questionnaire portions will last 
no longer that 2 hours  
to complete. If you would like to complete multiple portions of the experiment, you can. Each 
portion will be described individually below.  
4. What are the study procedures? All Participants  
In order to participate, individuals must: a) normal or corrected-to-normal hearing and vision; 
and b) no known neurological issues (epilepsy, brain injury, etc.). If you have an ASD diagnosis, 
we will also ask you to bring verification of diagnosis, and participant in a diagnostic verification 
task.  
This study will take place at four possible locations on the campus of the University of Western 
Ontario:  
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1. Westminster Hall  
2. Natural Sciences Centre  
3. Western Interdisciplinary Research Building  
4. Robarts Research Institute  
Questionnaires:  
You may be asked to complete several questionnaires about a range of personal skills and 
characteristics on paper or computer-based forms, and will be asked to complete a problem 
solving task and vocabulary test. This portion of participation may last up to two hours. 
Participation will take place at Western Universities London campus or online.  
Behavioural:  
You will be asked to look at pictures, listen to sounds, feel gentle taps, and watch some short 
videos that have been created specifically to understand how people attend to and understand 
what they see and what they hear. During the session, your eye movements will be recorded 
and tracked using eye-tracking equipment.  
EEG:  
If you are volunteering to participated in an EEG session, you will be asked to wear a soft, damp 
net over your head while you attend to the presentations that will allow us to non-invasively 
record your brain’s activity. We will ask you to not wear makeup to an EEG session, and hair 
products (i.e. a hair dryer, shampoo, towels) will be provided following the EEG. This portion of 
participation may last up to two hours.  
fMRI:  
If you are volunteering to participated in an fMRI session, in order to participate, you will be 
screened for exclusionary criteria of the MRI itself, including:  
1) Age outside of 4-65 years old 
2) Weight more than 300 pounds due to scanner table limitations. 
3) Significant medical illness (for example, cancer, HIV) or neurological illness (stroke, brain 
tumor, multiple sclerosis, epilepsy) 
4) Active substance abuse or dependence in the last 3 months, excluding caffeine and nicotine 
5) Head injury that has resulted in loss of consciousness for over 30 minutes 
6) Pregnancy/possibility of pregnancy 
7) Presence of any metal implant or shrapnel in the body 
8) Claustrophobia 
9) Breathing problems or motion disorders 
8) Body piercing/tattoos 
9) Permanent makeup 
10) Dentures 
11) Radiation seeds/implants 
12) Pacemakers or implantable stimulation systems  
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Because the scanner environment is very unusual and potentially uncomfortable you will have 
the choice to first participate in a training program designed to familiarize you with the MRI 
scanning machine. In this case, participation will involve coming to Western on two occasions. 
On the first visit, you would practice participating in the MRI experiment in a special training 
facility and complete standardized tests. This includes lying on a “mock scanner” bed with a 
replica head coil, and being placed into an MRI scanner. You will be able to hear the noises the 
scanner will make, and experience what it will be like to be in the scanner. On the second visit, 
you will participate in the actual imaging procedure. If you are comfortable participating in the 
actual MRI on the first visit, that is also possible. The MRI training facility is located in room 221 
of the Westminster Hall, which is located at 361 Windermere Rd. (near the corner of 
Windermere Rd. and Richmond St.). The actual MRI scanner is located in the Robarts 
Research Institute right beside the London Health Sciences Centre – University Campus on 
Perth Drive, just off Windermere Road in London Ontario. Magnetic resonance imaging is a 
non-invasive technique that does not involve injections, x- rays, or radiation.  
5. What are the risks and harms of participating? 
All studies, including this study, pose the possibility of confidentiality risks. These risks will be 
minimized in every way possible, detailed in section 8 of this document.  
fMRI only: There are no known biological risks associated with MR imaging. Some people 
cannot have an MRI because they have some type of metal in their body. For instance, if you 
have a heart pacemaker, artificial heart valves, metal implants such as metal ear implants, bullet 
pieces, chemotherapy or insulin pumps or any other metal such as metal clips or rings, they 
cannot have an MRI. During this test, you will lie in a small closed area inside a large magnetic 
tube. Some people may get scared or anxious in small places (claustrophobic). An MRI may 
also cause possible anxiety for people due to the loud banging made by the machine and the 
confined space of the testing area. You will be given either ear plugs or specially designed 
headphones to help reduce the noise.  
6. What are the benefits of participating in this study?  
You may not directly benefit from participating in this study but information gathered may 
provide benefits to society as a whole which include understanding the role that sensory 
perception plays in typical development, which may lead to theories and practices to help 
individuals who exhibit impaired sensory perception, such as those with autism.  
7. Can participants choose to leave the study?  
Participation is completely voluntary, you can withdraw from the study at any time. If you decide 
to stop participating, you will still be eligible to receive the promised compensation for agreeing 
to be in this project. In the event you withdraw from the study, all associated data collected will 
be immediately destroyed wherever possible.  
8. How will participants’ information be kept confidential?  
ALL INFORMATION OBTAINED DURING THE STUDY WILL BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE TO THE 
FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE BY LAW. WHILE WE DO OUR BEST TO PROTECT YOUR INFORMATION THERE 
IS NO GUARANTEE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO. THE INCLUSION OF YOUR NAME, CONTACT 
INFORMATION, AND DATE OF BIRTH MAY ALLOW SOMEONE TO LINK THE DATA AND IDENTIFY YOU. TO 
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MITIGATE THIS RISK TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE, ALL DATA WILL BE DE-IDENTIFIED 
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING COLLECTION AND LABELLED WITH A PARTICIPANT ID, AND THE FILE LINKING 
YOUR IDENTIFYING INFORMATION AND PARTICIPANT ID WILL BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY. ONLY 
STUDY TEAM WILL HAVE ACCESS TO STUDY- RELATED INFORMATION, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
WESTERN UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS BOARD MAY REQUIRE ACCESS TO 
YOUR STUDY-RELATED RECORDS TO MONITOR THE CONDUCT OF THE RESEARCH. THE EXPERIMENTAL 
DATA ACQUIRED IN THIS STUDY MAY, IN AN ANONYMIZED FORM THAT CANNOT BE CONNECTED TO YOU, 
BE USED FOR TEACHING PURPOSES, BE PRESENTED AT MEETINGS, PUBLISHED, SHARED WITH OTHER 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHERS OR USED IN FUTURE STUDIES. YOUR NAME OR OTHER IDENTIFYING 
INFORMATION WILL NOT BE USED IN ANY PUBLICATION OR TEACHING MATERIALS WITHOUT YOUR 
SPECIFIC PERMISSION. STUDY MATERIALS WILL BE ARCHIVED FOR 5 YEARS FOLLOWING THE 
COMPLETION OF THE STUDY, ANALYSIS, AND PUBLICATION.  
9. Are participants compensated to be in this study?  
Yes. Participants from the SONA system will be compensated with 1 research credit per hour 
toward PSYC1000 for participating in this study. If you are enrolled in a course other than Psych 
1000, your compensation will be based on your course outline. If you have any questions about 
the time or compensation, please feel free to contact the investigators before you consider 
signing the consent. Otherwise, compensation will be $5.00 for every 30 minutes of 
participation, and if travelling from outside of London, travel expenses will be reimbursed..  
10. What are the Rights of Participants?  
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may decide not to be in this study. Even if you 
consent to participate you have the right to not answer individual questions or to withdraw from 
the study at any time. If you choose not to participate or to leave the study at any time it will 
have no effect on your academic standing if you are a student.  
We will give you new information that is learned during the study that might affect your decision 
to stay in the study.  
You do not waive any legal right by signing this consent form.  
11. Whom do participants contact for questions? 
If you have questions about this research study please contact: Prof. Ryan Stevenson at the 
Department of  
Psychology, Western University, 519-661-2111 ext. 81182.  
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or the conduct of this 
study, you may contact The Office of Research Ethics 519-661-2111 ext. 81182.  
Thank you for your interest and participation in this study, it is greatly appreciated!  
This letter is yours to keep for future reference. 
Appendix B – Informed Consent Form  
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Sensory Processing in development and in autism  
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
Prof. Ryan Stevenson Department of Psychology Western University 519-661-2111 ext. 81182  
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study explained to me and I 
agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  
Questionnaires: Behavioural: EEG: 
fMRI:  
Name (please print): Signature: 
Date:  
□ Yes □ Yes □ Yes □ Yes  
□ No □ No □ No □ No  
_______________________________  
_______________________________  
_______________________________  
Name of Person Obtaining Consent________________________________ Signature of 
Person Obtaining Consent_____________________________  
Date for Person Obtaining Consent________________________________  
  
 
 
 
 
 
80 
Appendix C – The Adult Autism-Spectrum Quotient  
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Appendix D – Ethics Approval 
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